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Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract
This master's thesis concerns the situation of caregivers with a family member diagnosed with one or more mental disorders or 
illnesses. Research material was gathered for the purpose of the thesis primarily through participant observation and secondarily 
through loosely structured interviews. The gathering of the research material took place in conjunction with a peer support group 
meeting for caregivers. The analysis conducted within the thesis is based on the work of the sociologist Lucien Goldmann and that 
of the scholar of literature Richard Halpern and could be characterized as an inquiry into the presuppositions determining the 
outlook of caregivers as a group within the wider context of society. In the course of this analysis the work of Michel Foucault is 
also discussed, with the position argued for in the thesis being partially compatible with his engagement with the subject of 
madness. The thesis also draws on examples taken from the study of literature and drama to develop its argument.
While the thesis is concerned mainly with giving a broad picture of the quandaries faced by caregivers in contemporary society it 
takes as its point of departure the accounts given by the caregivers themselves, this called for an approach that was capable of 
teasing out the basic conditions determining or enabling the outlook or worldview of this group. As the thesis is mainly concerned 
with the more difficult, contradictory and fraught aspects of the situation caregivers find themselves in it was also necessary to 
perform an in-depth analysis of such concepts as those of tragedy, death and madness in order for me to be able to explore the 
aforementioned issues. The aim of the thesis is to offer an outline of certain difficulties faced by sociologists interested in the 
themes of madness, intelligibility, action and meaning. As such it constitutes more of an overview of the challenges faced by 
anyone interested in the subjects in question, it should not be read as offering any concrete conclusions. 
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1. Introduction
When a person is deemed mad by those around them it must necessarily 
change their social situation on a fundamental level. But this event must surely
also be one that fundamentally alters the lives of  those closest to the one 
afflicted, any change in a social relationship will after all have to be reciprocal 
in some way. The subject of  this thesis is the social situation of  these close 
kin, more specifically the family members of  those diagnosed with mental 
illnesses or disorders. This group, which I will term “caregivers” within this 
thesis, will be examined from the point of  view of  how it relates to the society
within which it exists and which thus also determines the form it takes. To be 
more specific, the purpose of  this thesis is to attempt to put the situation 
these caregivers are faced with into its wider social context and to moreover 
do this in a way that accounts for the contradictions and seemingly 
irreconcilable quandaries caused by these difficult circumstances. 
It is therefore perhaps best to first give a brief  overview of  the position these 
caregivers find themselves in. Within the context of  this thesis caregivers are 
conceptualized as being people who find themselves in a situation where one 
or more close kin have been diagnosed with a mental illness or disorder 
sufficiently severe that the caregiver in question has seen it as being necessary 
to care for their afflicted kin in a capacity that has, in its turn, led to these 
caregivers seeking out others finding themselves in the same situation in order
to better cope with the difficulties they face. A more thorough presentation of
the circumstances caregivers find themselves is given in the research material 
section of  the thesis.
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This thesis takes as its primary research site the meetings held by a peer 
support group for caregivers of  people diagnosed with mental illnesses or 
disorders, from this it follows that the caregivers that serve as the subject of  
this thesis are ones that themselves sought out this kind of  peer support; it is 
of  course necessary to point out here that the research subjects of  this thesis 
are in fact only a particular, self-selected subset of  caregivers in general. It also
needs to be pointed out in advance that, while the group meetings are of  
course facilitated by a caregiver’s association, the purpose of  the thesis is not 
to analyze the kind of  work an association like this does, nor is it to give an 
account of  the social context or function of  these associations. At the same 
time I will note that it is perhaps not possible to completely sideline these 
issues here, as we will see in the discussion section of  the thesis. Neither is the
objective of  this thesis to give an in-depth study of  the social dynamics of  the
peer support group meetings themselves, although this aspect will be 
discussed further in the section dealing with the research material of  the 
thesis. The primary purpose of  the thesis is rather to try to isolate some of  
the social basis that determines the form of  the situation caregivers face as a 
social group and, ultimately, to attempt to place it within the broader social 
totality of  contemporary society.
The research material gathered for the thesis was acquired through methods 
that could be broadly described as ethnographical in nature, more specifically 
through participant observation and through semi-structured interviews, with 
the participant observation serving as the main source of  research material 
and the interviews serving as a means to complement the findings gathered 
through observation. The research material consists of  notes taken in 
conjunction with the aforementioned participant observation which was 
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performed in connection with a peer support group for family members of  
people diagnosed with mental health disorders situated in a larger urban 
center within Finland. The analysis of  the research material is based on the 
approach staked out by the sociologist Lucien Goldmann in his work the 
Hidden God (1970) and on the more recent work of  Richard Halpern who, I 
will argue, could be seen as having developed a modernized version of  this 
same approach even as his work does not directly engage with that of  
Goldmann. 
While the work of  Michel Foucault is engaged with at length in the thesis and 
while there could be perhaps be said to be a some similarities between the 
approach I have taken here and Foucault’s genealogical approach (e.g., 
Halpern, 1991, pp. 1 – 15), as we will see later on in the thesis, the main thrust
of  the thesis relies on a theoretical frameworks derived from Marxist and 
marxisant theory, primarily that of  the aforementioned Goldmann and 
Halpern. To a lesser extent this thesis will also engage with the work of  Judith 
Butler, György Lukács and with the thought of  Adam Ferguson by way of  the
sociologists Samantha Ashenden and Lisa Hill, as well as with various other 
scholars engaging with either subjects or theoretical traditions relevant for this
thesis. The approach taken in this thesis requires a somewhat in-depth 
engagement with various concepts, primarily those of  madness and tragedy, 
that need to be thoroughly defined and contextualized in order to avoid 
succumbing to hopeless levels of  abstraction, necessitating a large portion of  
the thesis to be set aside for this purpose. While the thesis thus opts for a 
mode of  analysis not particularly closely associated to that of  ethnography 
there is at least one significant similarity that remains, namely that the goal of  
the thesis is to give an account of  the way that the caregivers themselves 
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perceive their the situation they find themselves in, more specifically to give as
clear as possible picture of  what a coherent outlook shared by caregivers 
would have to look like given their social position. The main argument of  this 
thesis is that this outlook will in significant part be characterized by something
like what Goldmann (1970) terms a tragic vision, as we will see in further on 
in the thesis. 
2. Prior Research
Within this section of  the thesis I will give an overview of  research examining
the situation of  caregivers, focusing on the Finnish context. To avoid 
repeating myself I will leave the presentation of  issues relating to the other 
more theoretically derived central subjects of  the thesis, such as those of  
tragedy, madness and the role of  family within society in a broader sense, to 
the theoretical framework section of  the thesis. To understand these later 
discussions a brief  outline of  prior research into the social position of  
caregivers is necessary. 
While the point of  view of  caregivers is not one that has traditionally been 
accorded pride of  place (e.g., Maanmieli, 2019, p. 182) the importance of  
taking the families of  those diagnosed with mental disorders into account is 
hardly a particularly recent insight within Finnish psychiatric care, with 
research acknowledging the importance of  supporting these families has been 
published here at least as early as 1971 (Anttinen, Eloranta & Stenij, 1971). 
More thorough research on the utility of  family-centered approaches has been
conducted since then, for example by Juha Holma (1999) who argues for the 
need of  practices that account for the families and social contexts of  
rehabilitees if  psychiatric interventions are to be efficacious. Eija Stengård 
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(2005) comes to largely similar conclusions as Holma in her study about the 
needs and burdens of  caregivers with a family member diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, noting especially that failure to support caregivers in the 
troubles they face in dealing with their situation is likely to lead to their overall
well-being suffering as a consequence (Ibid., pp. 114 – 115). 
To some limited extent this call for recognizing the needs of  caregivers within 
psychiatric care has been answered, with the families of  people diagnosed 
with psychiatric disorders being mentioned in the Käypä hoito 
recommendations for care (eg., Käypä hoito -suositus, Kaksisuuntainen 
mielialahäiriö, 2013). However, seeing as it was a recurring theme during the 
peer support meetings I observed that the caregivers expressed that they saw 
themselves as neglected, ignored and sometimes even blamed by healthcare 
professionals it would appear as if  there are still significant conflicts at play in 
the interaction between family members and healthcare professionals. For the 
purposes of  this thesis the main focus will thus be on the points of  conflict 
and on the contradictory aspects of  the situation of  the caregiver and not so 
much on development within psychiatric care as such, both for the reason that
the research material gathered for the thesis features a preponderance of  
accounts of  these kinds of  sentiments, as we will see, but also for the reason 
that the primary subject of  the thesis is not psychiatric practice in itself. As a 
brief  aside on this point I will note that it appeared to be a shared sentiment 
among both caregivers and people working with the association facilitating the
peer support group meetings that I spoke to that the stance taken by mental 
healthcare professionals towards family members of  patients had improved 
somewhat throughout the years but that significant hurdles remained if  the 
situation faced by the caregivers was to improve in a fundamental way. This 
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would seem to dovetail with the analysis conducted by Karoliina Maanmieli 
(2019) on the subject of  patients’ and caregivers’ accounts of  their experience 
with psychiatric care. Maanmieli (Ibid.) writes about how caregivers express 
feeling both burdened and shamed by their experiences as family members of  
people diagnosed with mental disorders, potentially leading to negative 
consequences for all involved. 
Kaisa Ketokivi and Mianna Meskus (2015) analyze the subject of  families 
thrown into disorder by disruptive events and the corresponding need to rely 
on different peer support networks, doing so by focusing on the fraught 
notion of  agency. While the subjects of  peer support and families dealing with
hardships is of  course relevant to this thesis as subject matters the concept of  
agency is also interesting here as I will explain. Ketokivi and Meskus (2015, p. 
2) point out that the framework of  structure versus agency remains in itself  
an abstract framework, not helped by the fact that the twin concepts of  
agency and structure often remain under-theorized and vague. The authors go
on to describe their aim as being to study the issue of  agency through a focus 
on how acts and actors are mediated by different “enabling and constraining 
structures” (Ibid.), framing this as an attempt to bring to light certain of  the 
contradictions inherent in the concept. 
What is interesting here, from the point of  view of  this thesis, is however not 
the pursuit of  an improved notion of  structure and agency but rather the 
attention given to what happens when the limits of  these concepts become 
apparent. The objective for me will be to attempt to put forward an 
explanation for why action has come to been seen as simultaneously 
impossible yet impossible to dispense with, what Ketokivi and Meskus 
9
describe as “the co-existing impossibility and immanent presence of  individual
agency” (Ibid., p. 11). Within this thesis I will try to develop this theme by 
investigating the contradictory and ever elusive notion of  what I here will 
term not agency but rather action, following the example of  Halpern (2017). 
But in order to properly understand what is meant by the concept of  action 
here it is necessary to first understand how Halpern understands the closely 
related concept of  tragedy, which I will in turn first introduce by examining 
how this concept was conceived of  in the earlier work of  Goldmann (1970). 
 3. Theoretical Framework
 3.1. The tragic vision – Lucien Goldmann
The concept of  tragedy is the focus of  Lucien Goldmann’s book the Hidden 
God (1970). In the book Goldmann (Ibid.) explores the worldview manifested 
in Blaise Pascal’s Pensées and within Jean Racine’s tragedies and how these have 
their social basis in the Jansenist religious movement and in the social group 
of  the noblesse de robe in 17th century France. Goldmann’s method hinges on 
explicating the relationship between the social position of  this group and the 
worldview it professes, in this case described as constituting a “tragic vision” 
(Ibid., p. 22). These kinds of  worldviews or outlooks are according to 
Goldmann always constituted as a “meaningful structure” (Goldmann, 1980, 
p. 100), meaning that it is possible to locate an internal coherence within 
them. In seeking the coherence of  the outlook we are interested in we are able
to see how this particular outlook is homologous to a particular 
corresponding social formation (Schoenberg, 1985, pp. 210 – 212), which in 
turn has to be understood if  we are to fully make sense of  the outlook in 
question. 
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In order for this kind of  worldview to begin to grasp the totality of  the world 
that it exists within the worldview in question would have to be one belonging
to what Goldmann, following standard Marxist terminology, terms a social 
class (Goldmann, 1970, pp. 16 – 17). At this point it is necessary to point out 
that the caregivers studied in this thesis are a not constituted as a social class 
based on their relation to the productive forces of  society or on their relation 
to the state as such, unlike the noblesse de robe who had a quite specific position 
in regard to the state of  their time (Goldmann, 1970, pp. 118 – 120). This is 
important to bring up because according to Goldmann’s Marxian typology of  
classes a class is characterized by its position within production and by its 
relationship to other classes, with the worldview of  classes being based on 
these two factors (Goldmann, 1969, pp. 102 – 103). This means that if  one 
wants to truly understand a group’s worldview one has to examine its position 
within society. This is also the case in relation to what Goldmann (Ibid.) terms
social groups, meaning sections of  society that are not primarily defined by 
their immediate relation to the sphere of  production. 
What characterizes the caregivers as a social group, their uniting social 
characteristic in other words, is rather the fact that they have found themselves
in a situation where they are compelled to care for a family member who has 
been diagnosed with a mental illness or disorder. If  we follow Goldmann’s 
terminology caregivers would thus be classified as a social group, not as a class
since their interests are not directed toward the social-economical structure as 
a whole (Ibid., p. 17). Goldmann argues that as a result of  this groups, as 
opposed to classes, only possess partial worldviews or ideologies and not 
totalizing and all-encompassing worldviews (Goldmann, 1969, pp. 102 – 103). 
Whatever the case may be, Goldmann portrays the task of  the researcher as 
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going far beyond giving an abstract account of  particular worldviews, to truly 
succeed it would be necessary to also thoroughly study “the concrete 
expressions which these visions assume in the everyday world” (Goldmann, 
1970, p. 19). 
The importance of  studying the internal limits of  the worldview, its inability 
to give a wholly consistent and unambiguous account of  its social-historical 
context, is also emphasized by Goldmann, who goes on to note that merely 
charting out these limits is insufficient on its own, the researcher must tackle 
these inconsistencies as “problems which he must solve” (Ibid.). What this 
means for us when applied to the question of  the caregivers is that an attempt
has to be made to explain the contradictions that crop up when we examine 
the outlook of  this group closer, merely noting that contradictions exist will 
not be enough. I will later on examine how these contradictions can be 
understood as being located in the conflict arising between competing ethical 
claims put forth by the spheres of  the family, the state and civil society. 
But what characterizes tragedy in Goldmann’s conception of  it? It will be 
necessary for me to attempt to answer that question briefly here. The tragedy 
Goldmann writes of  is in its most stripped-down form characterized by  “a 
refusal of  the world from within the world” (Ibid., p. 53), it involves adhering 
to an absolutely coherent way of  being in the world that inevitably turn out to 
be incompatible with the world the tragic character finds themselves in. The 
unambiguous and unrelenting adherence required by tragedy forces the tragic 
character to hold on to values that are irreconcilable with the sordid state of  
the world as it exists, meaning that this refusal is a refusal of  the world of  the 
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living, it is incompatible with life as actually lived in the prosaic world of  the 
everyday (Ibid., pp. 80 – 86). 
But while tragedy in Goldmann’s conception of  it, as in every conception of  it
used in this thesis, thus requires that the tragic character or characters in some 
way leave the world of  the living this does not necessarily mean that they have
to end up dying within the tragic work (e.g., Ibid., p. 337). What is interesting 
from the point of  view of  this thesis is the fact that Goldmann argues that, 
for Racine, death does not have to come in the form of  death either, it can 
assume the form of  madness as it does for Orestes in the play Andromaque 
(Ibid., p. 327), a play that I want to note certainly broaches the topical subject 
of  difficult family situations in addition to dealing with the subject of  
madness. This identification of  madness with death will be relevant later on in
the thesis, as we will see when discussing Ferit Güven’s and Foucault’s analysis 
of  this issue.
 But to return to the issue of  Racine and Andromaque for the time being I want
to briefly bring attention to the fact that Foucault also analyses this play, 
specifically in his History of  Madness, arguing that it serves to illustrate an 
important shift occurring in the way madness was conceived of  at the time of  
its writing (Foucault, Khalfa & Murphy, 2006b). This will be elaborated on in 
the discussion section of  the thesis, but before we are able to do that it will be
necessary to examine certain aspects of  Foucault’s approach to madness itself.
3.2. Madness and intelligibility – Michel Foucault
In an interview conducted in 1984 Foucault saw it necessary to emphasize 
that, contrary to what some of  his readers had concluded, he did not in fact 
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claim “that madness does not exist” (Foucault & Lotringer, 1996, p. 446) but 
that the issue he was interested in was rather that of  examining how the 
experience of  madness had been subsumed under the rubric of  mental illness 
at a given time and place by the institutions of  an emerging field of  psychiatry
(Ibid.). Thus he positions himself  as an examiner or interrogator of  psychiatry
rather than as a seeker of  some pre-existing, pre-psychiatric madness. 
Jacques Lagrange (Foucault, M., Burchell, G., & Lagrange, J., 2006, p. 349 – 
363) however argues in his commentary on Foucault’s lectures on psychiatric 
power that this had not always been the case. According to Lagrange there 
had in fact occurred a shift in the way Foucault approached the question of  
madness between the time he wrote History of  Madness and by the time he gave
these lectures. Lagrange cites the foreword to the original french edition of  
History of  Madness where Foucault describes the goal of  this work as being to 
write a history “of  madness itself, in its vivacity, before all capture by 
knowledge” (Ibid., p. 349), which seems to imply that Foucault as of  the time 
of  the writing of  History of  Madness saw this raw state of  madness as 
something that could be brought to light and comprehended on its own 
terms. However, there are reasons to doubt this conclusion. The fact that 
Foucault never sought to deny the existence of  madness as an experience is 
something he reiterated several times in fact, as pointed out by Matti Peltonen 
(2004, pp. 206 – 214) who goes on to note that the view, all too common 
within the social sciences, of  Foucault as some sort of  “extreme advocate for 
social constructivism” (Ibid., p. 209) where everything can be reduced to 
discourses without any underlying basis being necessary is not compatible 
with how he himself  conceived of  his work. 
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In her book describing the mental asylum on the island of  Själö and the 
treatment of  the women committed there Jutta Ahlbeck-Rehn (2006) also 
broaches the above-mentioned subject, that is, the feasibility of  letting 
madness tell the truth about itself. Writing about History of  Madness Ahlbeck-
Rehn notes that while it is true that Foucault attests to wanting to let madness 
speak for itself  and about wanting to uncover its essence he also saw that the 
only intelligible things madness could say would have to be spoken in the 
language of  reason, that it could only make itself  understood by way of  
reason (Ibid., pp. 316). As Ahlbeck-Rehn goes on to note, referring to the 
same preface Lagrange is basing his claims on, the impossibility of  bringing an
unmediated madness to light is one of  the most central themes present in 
History of  Madness (Ibid., p. 317). Coming to a similar conclusion as Ahlbeck-
Rehn, Blanchot argues that if  Foucault ever thought there might be “a depth 
to madness, that it constitutes a fundamental experience situated outside 
history” (Foucault & Blanchot, 1987, p. 67), then this must have been at most 
a beneficial mistake for him, teaching him to be wary of  the idea of  hidden 
depths holding closed-off  truths. 
But even if  Foucault did end up disavowing this sort of  dallying with the 
arational this does not remove certain formal difficulties arising from the 
relationship between reason and nonreason. Butler describes Foucault as 
being acutely aware of  the fact that any criticism or interrogation of  reason 
inevitably risks being conceptualized by the reason in question as irrationality, 
with the only way of  evading this risk being to accede and ascribe to the 
reason in question (Butler, 2005, pp. 118 – 119). This of  course is very much 
relevant for the problem at hand, namely to the question of  the relation 
between madness and reason, where even the capacity of  the mad to say 
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anything at all about their madness is dependent on the reason that 
fundamentally puts into question their access to any kind of  reason (Ibid., p. 
124). Any questioning of  this reason would thus in some way risk being 
associated with madness itself  and anything said by those deemed mad would 
risk being reabsorbed into the reason that makes their accounts intelligible. As
Güven puts it, “one cannot correct this situation by trying to give a voice to 
madness, because madness would thereby become something other, 
something rational”  (Güven, 2005, p. 3). 
Güven (Ibid., pp. 8 – 10) also  argues that the concept of  madness understood
from the point of  view of  philosophy should not be seen as reducible to the 
psychiatric understanding of  mental illness and that the quandaries of  
madness and death are in fact fundamental questions for modern philosophy. 
With this in mind, I primarily write about “madness” and not e.g. “mental 
illness” in this thesis, since much like for Güven (Ibid., p. 8), my approach to 
the issue of  madness differs from that of  psychiatric medicine. More 
specifically, the term “madness” is used for this phenomenon, this experience 
of  derangement, to the extent that it remains understood not through the 
framework of  psychiatric knowledge but rather through another form of  
meaningful structure. In the context of  this thesis this would of  course 
primarily refer to the form of  understanding caregivers have of  the issue of  
madness but I am of  course also drawing on various conceptions of  madness 
developed by a somewhat eclectic bunch of  sociologists, philosophers, literary
critics and others in my analysis off  the outlook of  the aforementioned 
caregivers. While speaking of  the afflicted family members of  the caregivers 
studied in this thesis I will speak of  them as people diagnosed with mental 
illnesses or disorders only in so far as their situation is discussed form the 
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point of  view of  the aforementioned psychiatric framework, for example 
when the fact that they have received a diagnosis becomes relevant, the rest of
the time I will instead write of  madness. 
Having now discussed why the interpretation that Foucault in his History of  
Madness would have envisaged madness as being reachable in a pure state 
appears to be somewhat tenuous this does not however mean that there are 
no changes in the way he made his inquiries regarding madness during this 
time, as compared to the approach his later work would take. As the aim of  
this thesis is not to review the changes in Foucault's oeuvre throughout his 
career I will limit myself  here to noting that in this thesis I am mainly 
interested in how he tackled these issues in his earlier work, primarily in the 
History of  Madness (Foucault et al., 2006b) and in his lecture series on 
psychiatric power (Foucault, Burchell & Lagrange, 2006). 
3.2.1. On the necessity of  conceptual clarification
At this point it is probably reasonable to ask why I have seen it as being 
necessary to write at length about the way Foucault understood madness. The 
answer I would give to on this question is that the form of  the thesis requires 
a thorough exposition of  the central concepts used; if  I am to attempt to lay 
the groundwork for the kind of  thorough investigation Goldmann claims is 
necessary to move beyond a uselessly abstract understanding of  the issues at 
hand then a minimal first step would have to be to “isolate the object to be 
studied” (Goldmann, 1980, p. 63), as he puts it. This is what I have attempted 
to do in the previous sections, in this case with regard to the concepts of  
tragedy and madness. In the following chapters I will do the same thing for 
other central concepts, namely those of  family, state and civil society. At this 
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point I want to point out that because of  the approach taken within the thesis 
the tasks of  laying out the theoretical framework and that of  defining of  
terms used cannot really be separated from the actual discussion of  my 
findings, therefore requiring me to go back and forth between discussing the 
concepts and discussing the research material. As Goldmann (Ibid., pp. 69 – 
70) explains, one must resort to concepts to make sense of  isolated empirical 
data, but to find out if  one’s concepts are up to the task one also has to 
investigate how these concepts have come to be composed in the first place, 
which in turn requires investigating their social basis. 
While the subject matter of  this thesis will not be those deemed mad 
themselves but instead the members of  their families I believe that the above 
clarification of  terms regarding the experience of  madness will prove to be 
necessary since, while granting that the thesis will not tackle the question of  
the experience of  madness head-on, it deals with a group that more often 
than not will see far more of  the consequences of  madness than any other 
group of  people save for those themselves deemed mad. As one caregiver put 
it to me in a conversation, while a psychiatrist might spend much of  their 
workday meeting people diagnosed with mental disorders individually they will
still only meet these people for sessions lasting perhaps just half  an hour each,
the family members of  these same persons will on the contrary often spend 
much of  their waking hours in their company, caring for them or otherwise 
spending time with them during the course of  their daily lives. 
In addition I want to here point out that any kind of  communicable, direct 
experience of  madness is an impossibility from the outset within the 
conceptual framework of  this thesis; while caregivers may not have any direct 
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experience of  madness it could be argued that neither have those deemed mad
themselves, save for fleeting and unrecuperable moments, e.g. psychosis. It is 
worth remembering that Foucault sees the situation of  the “man of  madness”
(Foucault et al., 2006b, p. xxviii) as one cut of  from communication except by 
resorting to “a reason that is no less abstract” (Ibid.) than the abstraction that 
is the pathologizing framework of  psychiatry. Here it is also necessary to note 
that while Foucault mainly wanted to examine how the split between madness 
and reason was put in place, what I will attempt to do on the other hand is 
something not quite the same, yet not entirely different, namely try to 
elucidate how caregivers have come to navigate and understand this unclear 
but absolute border. 
3.3. Tragedy and the crisis of  action – Richard Halpern
While Halpern (2017) is just as much as Goldmann engaged in analyzing 
tragedy through a Marxist approach there are still some differences in 
approach. While Goldmann (1970) sought to understand tragedy as a 
meaningful structure connected to a discrete social basis Halpern (2017, p. 8) 
is instead interested in tragedy mainly, but not exclusively, by dint of  its what it
enables us to know about action.  Writing about how tragedy enables us to 
examine action and its “conditions of  possibility and of  intelligibility, its 
efficacy and constraints, its fraught relation to production” (Halpern, 2017, p. 
8) Halpern likens tragedy to philosophy in its enabling of  meaning-making 
and interpretation. Action here therefore means meaningful and intelligible 
actions (Ibid.). 
But here it becomes necessary to point out that Halpern sees action 
undergoing a crisis of  sorts, with a concomitant crisis occurring within 
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tragedy. Much like Goldmann (1970), who saw tragic greatness as 
incompatible with everyday life, Halpern sees action as having been 
undermined by something which for marxisant writers must be a more 
fundamental part of  our world, namely the sphere of  production (Halpern, 
2017, pp. 255 – 260). As I will discuss later on in the thesis this development 
has been observed within the social or political sciences in some ways since at 
least the days of  Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson and is associated by 
Halpern with the development of  civil society and capitalism (Ibid., pp. 29 – 
74). What Halpern (Ibid.) is attempting to do by examining the uncertain 
continued possibility of  tragic drama is thus not reducible to the field of  the 
theatrical arts but rather extends into charting the extent to which action is 
meaningfully possible at all in our time, doing this through engaging with the 
work of  various various tragedians but also with the work of  theorists like the 
aforementioned political economist Ferguson who will be discussed further 
on in this thesis. I thus hold that tragedy as it is understood in this thesis has 
broad applicability, going far beyond the social-historical context to which 
Goldmann saw it as being confined. Even if  I would agree with him and with 
Halpern that its preconditions appear to be disappearing I will argue that the 
concept still has valence and that it may well be that it is impossible to 
completely do away with the concept of  tragedy for the time being, as we will 
see.
While Halpern analyzes a certain concept of  action it must also be noted that 
this conception of  action has very little in common with the aforementioned 
concept of  the “capable actor” criticized by Ketokivi and Meskus (2015), who
point out that far from standing for a possibility of  transcending the currently 
existing social-historical arrangement this conception of  action rather ends up
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serving as a standard for how well a given actor measures up to the 
expectations of  agency that hold true under that very same arrangement 
(Ibid., p. 3). Halpern’s conceptualization of  action is directly opposed to this 
kind of  acquiescence to the reproduction of  currently existing society, 
focusing on the role of  capitalist society in bringing about this “crisis of  
action” (Halpern, 2017, pp. 2 – 3) in the first place. Basing his inquiry on a 
Marxist analysis, Halpern sets out to examine how the sphere of  economy and
of  production demarcate which forms noneconomical processes within a 
given society can assume (Halpern, 1991, pp. 13 – 15). 
While Halpern is not arguing that economical factors completely determine 
noneconomical factors he still holds that it is “clear that the economic plays 
the leading role” (Ibid., p. 15). Needless to say this stance places his project in 
close proximity to Goldmann’s aforementioned project in the Hidden God, 
which is of  course no surprise considering their shared Marxist point of  
departure. Another point of  affinity is their shared interest in the subject of  
theater and drama, but since that is not the central subject of  this thesis I will 
limit my explication of  their analysis of  these matters to examples relevant for
the situation of  caregivers.  The similarities between these two writers are not 
however limited to the affinity they share when it comes to the questions 
method and of  subject studied; Goldmann and Halpern also come to 
somewhat similar conclusions regarding the meaning of  tragedy and its 
relationship to the productive forces within society. According to Goldmann’s 
typology of  worldviews the tragic vision has been superseded by the 
dialectical worldview, by which he means a worldview built on the insights 
offered by Hegel, Marx and those who draw on them (e.g., Goldmann, 1970, 
pp. 214 – 219; Schoenberg, 1985, pp. 209 – 210), meaning that the social-
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historical basis of  a tragic outlook is eroding. I would argue that this has 
obvious similarities to the conclusions drawn by Halpern (2017) when it 
comes to the diminishing leeway afforded to meaningful action, as I will 
elaborate further on in the discussion portion of  the thesis. 
I also want to point out that Halpern (1991, pp. 11 – 15) himself  positions his 
project as being to some extent a response to the kind of  genealogical inquiry 
undertaken by Foucault. Halpern (Ibid., pp. 10 – 13) argues that while 
Foucault himself  was indebted to Marxist approaches in his work his attempts
to move away from the reliance on economical factors as the fundamental 
explaining factor of  processes within society, with Foucault seemingly wanting
to accord noneconomic social processes an amount of  autonomy that, 
according to Halpern, threatens to make the internal coherence of  the relation
between different spheres within society impossible to tease out. This would 
in turn lead to any account of  how new social processes or formations emerge
lacking a coherent foundation, necessarily making any such account an 
abstract one (Ibid.). On this point I will agree with Halpern, which in the 
context of  this thesis means that I will attempt to analyze the situation facing 
the caregivers from the point of  view of  its position within the broader 
context of  society, especially with regard to how economical forces have come
to indirectly delimit the courses of  action available to caregivers, as they have 
come to limit action in general for Halpern. This is of  course also largely the 
same approach taken by Goldmann in his inquiry, as I have discussed earlier in
the thesis.
But if  Halpern and those who arrive at the same conclusion as him are right 
about the diminishing interpretive and meaning-making potentials of  the 
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concept of  action then should we not simply dispense with the concept 
altogether? Maybe one day, but for the present I would argue that we will find 
that we will be unable to do so without cutting ourselves off  from certain 
unique points of  inquiry. This is the conclusion that several of  the writers 
previously cited in this thesis have arrived at in regard to this question, 
Ketokivi and Meskus writing that being able to take action is at least at the 
level of  a principle still clearly valued within contemporary society, even if  
“individual autonomy may be empirically groundless” (Ketokivi & Meskus, 
2015, p. 10) as they put it. With regard to the situation of  the caregivers 
studied in this thesis I will however follow the example of  Halpern in treating 
the question of  action and of  tragedy as mainly a question of  the continued 
possibility and intelligibility of  meaningful action. 
3.4. The eclipse of  subjectivity – Judith Butler
As I have explained in the previous section of  the thesis I hold that the 
question of  meaningful action is one that is necessary to engage with if  we are
to understand why caregivers feel so at a loss in regard to their family 
situation. It would perhaps seem sensible that meaningful action would require
a subject capable of  carrying out said actions. But if  meaningful action is less 
and less possible then what of  the subject? If  we follow Butler (2005) on this 
issue it would appear as if  the subject is caught in a crisis just as much as 
action is. But how does the realm of  the ethical live on, as it appears to still do
for the caregivers, if  the acting subject has been sidelined? Butler puts forth an
argument for how this is possible, arguing that even as subjects have to be 
seen as to some extent “divided, ungrounded, or incoherent” (Butler, 2005,  p.
19) this view of  subjectivity does not preclude the possibility of  ethics or of  
socially situated responsibilities. The crux here is, according to Butler, to 
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realize that subjects are necessarily relational beings, that precisely because the 
subject is opaque to itself  and somehow lacking it seeks out and is dependent 
on these relations to others like itself  (Ibid., pp. 19 – 20). 
Building on the arguments of  Adorno and Foucault, Butler (Ibid., pp. 110 – 
111) portrays the issue to be solved as being not so much the feasibility of  
grounding ethics in the subject, which is largely discounted out of  hand, much
as it is in the approaches of  other theorists drawn upon in this thesis such as 
in the works of  Halpern (1991; 2017) and Blanchot (e.g., Blanchot & Foucault,
1987). Rather, Butler chooses to frame the continued, if  more and more 
hemmed in, existence of  the subject as being “a problem for ethics” (Ibid., p.  
110, italics in original). This problem is one that is would argue is relevant if  
one is to understand the flip side to the fading away of  action and the subject, 
namely the question of  why caregivers still assert a responsibility to act, a 
responsibility that is framed by them as being beyond questioning and 
inconceivable not to act upon. While it would perhaps be intuitive to attempt 
view caregivers as subjects or perhaps as together constituting a collective 
subject (e.g., Goldmann, 1980, pp. 55 – 62) I would argue with the above 
discussion in mind that we are probably better of  seeing caregivers as 
constituting a social position within broader society. 
It is important to also note that the absence of  an unambiguous subject has 
never in itself  precluded tragic action. As Vernant describes it, writing on the 
subject of  Greek tragedy and on the separation of  the world of  men from 
that of  the gods, tragedy occurs in a liminal zone where acts become 
meaningful when integrated into “an order that is beyond man and eludes 
him” (Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1988, p. 47). According to Butler (2005, pp. 
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24 – 26) the mere fact that I struggle to recognize another exposes the limits 
of  currently existing norms, revealing the constraints inherent in 
contemporary “regimes of  truth” (Ibid.), to use the Foucauldian terminology 
used by Butler here.
But what is it that enables ethical frameworks at all here if  the subject is 
discounted? As Butler puts it, if  one proceeds from ethics and from asking 
how one ought to behave in relation to another one has already become 
entangled, has become “caught up in a realm of  social normativity” (Butler, 
2005, p. 25), it is not conceptually possible to have presocial social relations to 
another after all. This however seems to destabilize the realm of  the ethical 
even further, if  ethical relation is not presocial it must always be dependent on
something external to ethics. For Butler (2005, p. 35), as for the many Marxist 
critics cited in this thesis, this externality is the social-historical situation. The 
norms by which I express myself  are not my own, they exist as historically 
situated temporary circumstances, the self  is not capable of  being 
conceptualized without them but they themselves are indifferent to any given 
self  (Butler, 2005, p. 35). To make our narratives understandable, we are 
forced to make ourselves substitutable for anyone else, to explain who we are 
we have to rely on the existence of  happenings that have preceded us and that
still are to some extent outside our grasp (Butler, 2005, p. 37). Our accounts 
about ourselves are surely secondhand.
3.5. Civil society, for better or for worse – Adam Ferguson
It is one thing to assert that the concepts of  the subject and of  action have 
become more and more questioned, if  not questionable. But what social 
institutions and what social processes are the site where this development 
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takes place, where is the development discussed in the preceding sections of  
the thesis occurring? And where would we locate the caregivers as a social 
group in relation to these institutions? If  we agree with Goldmann (1980) that
refraining from trying to answer these questions would be to let the 
experience of  the caregivers remain untethered from its wider context then it 
appears as if  this would have to be our next task here in this thesis. Following 
once again the example of  Halpern (2017, pp. 53 – 74) I will give an account 
of  how our understanding of  this question hinges on observations first made 
by Adam Ferguson in his examination of  what he termed civil society. 
While Ferguson is, as we will see, very much so concerned with issues closely 
related to the crisis of  action this did not mean that he envisioned society 
coming to a standstill. On the contrary he viewed society as existing in a 
constant state of  conflict brought on by developments within civil society, 
more specifically by developments in those spheres of  it dealing with the 
concerns of  economics and production, causing it to develop throughout 
history with little to no regard for the actual intentions of  its inhabitants (Hill, 
2001). 
This aspect of  Ferguson is also discussed by Foucault (2008) in his Birth of  
Biopolitics course, where Foucault focuses mainly on the originality of  
Ferguson's conceptualization of  civil society. For Ferguson, Foucault (2008, 
pp. 306 – 307) explains, the economy is included within civil society, with 
commercial society arising within civil society as a consequence of  the blind 
self-interest of  individual people over time taking on definite forms. But 
commercial society has a special significance for Ferguson according to 
Foucault, with it constituting “the motor of  history in civil society” (Ibid., p. 
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307), ensuring that civil society is constantly in a state of  transformation and 
thus always historically contingent. As noted by Samantha Ashenden (2015), 
Foucault was clearly cognizant of  the originality of  the way the approach 
taken by Ferguson and other members of  the Scottish Enlightenment 
“produced a newly historicized conception of  society” (Ibid., p. 37), a 
conception that would later come to be important for theorists who would use
it to arrive at radically different conclusion, as I will attempt to show. 
But it is necessary to point out that this is not the only way in which the 
subject of  history is relevant here. As Foucault (2008, pp. 307 – 308) notes, 
the production of  history within civil society is here identified as the 
production of  history in general, the constant self-transformation of  civil 
society is for Ferguson what enables the “never-ending generation of  history” 
(Ibid., p. 308), leading in turn to a never-ending rearranging of  every other 
sphere of  society. Commercial society will for as long as it exists give rise to 
new history, for civil society nothing will be static and neither will, crucially for
the subject of  this thesis, the situation of  the family or the state. After all, if  
we are to understand the standpoint of  the caregivers as being more or less 
determined by social-historical circumstances then surely we have to attempt 
to theorize why these circumstances have come to be and how they might 
eventually one day cease to be. 
Ferguson’s continued relevance for sociology has been argued for by Lisa Hill 
(2001), who concurs with Foucault's above analysis of  Ferguson’s conception 
of  civil society as the driving force behind social change in societies where it 
exists (Ibid., pp. 295 – 296). Hill notes that social conflict, which she sees as 
being part of  civil society since its inception, in the way it is theorized by 
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Ferguson bears a striking similarity to later Marxist conceptions of  it (Ibid.). 
This is certainly the case with respect to the marxisant scholars cited in this 
thesis, who clearly see civil society, and more specifically the economical 
aspects of  it, as the driver behind the crises of  action and tragedy they 
describe in their respective works. It should also be mentioned here that the  
influence of  Ferguson is one that is very much so acknowledged by Marx 
himself. In a passage presaging the aforesaid debate about the domination of  
commercial society over other parts of  society Marx writes that the “division 
of  labour seizes upon, not only the economic, but every other sphere of  
society” (Marx, 1976, p. 474), noting that Ferguson had foreseen this 
development when he wrote that with the emergence of  commercial society 
there was a real risk that “We make a nation of  Helots, and have no free 
citizens” (Ferguson, 1767, p. 285, as cited in Marx, 1976, p. 474).
Foucault is of  course also aware of  the influence Ferguson’s conceptualization
of  civil society has had on Marxist thought, the term “motor of  history” 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 305), used by Foucault to describe the role of  civil society 
in Ferguson’s work is after all itself  borrowed from Marxist terminology (e.g., 
Lukács, 1972, p. 58), as he alludes to. Seeing as the driving force of  history is 
for Ferguson economical in nature, much like for the later Marxists,  
Foucault's usage of  the term would seem to be motivated in its retroactive use
here, not that there are not important differences between the approach 
Foucault takes and those of  Marxists. The influence of  Ferguson and of  
political economy in general on Marx has also been dealt with extensively by 
other writers, e.g., Hill (2007),  Halpern (2017) and Schoenberg (1985, pp. 76 –
78) to name only a couple cited in this thesis, so keeping in mind the scope 
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and aim of  this thesis, I will refrain from delving further into that issue here 
myself. 
To return to the subject of  tragedy it must also be pointed out that Ferguson 
had his own interpretation of  the possibility of  tragedy and meaningful 
action. According to Ferguson “the happiness of  citizens requires their active 
pursuit of  virtue” (Halpern, 2017. p. 55), this being possible only outside the 
confines of  commercial society, where citizens are not reducible to mere 
population or to subjects of  the market.  Meaningful activeness, action that 
surpasses the passive pseudo-action of  commercial society, exists for 
Ferguson only when actions possess “a potentially tragic dimension, … 
purchased at the cost of  mortality” (Ibid., p. 54). Here again we encounter the
subject of  death, inseparable as it is from the sense of  the tragic. While I 
would I would claim that this shows that we could argue for a compatibility 
existing between Goldmann’s analysis of  tragedy and Fergusons’s sense of  it, 
thus bringing the section on ethical frameworks full circle, I also think it will 
be necessary to first address some of  the contradictions and incompatibilities 
that, it must be admitted, still exist within the theoretical framework of  the 
thesis. 
3.6. Addressing some contradictions within the theoretical framework
In this section I will explain how certain aspects of  Goldmann’s oeuvre places
him at odds with some of  the other theorists utilized in this thesis. The reason
that this matter has to be addressed here is that it reveals a fundamental 
disagreement regarding what makes subjectivity or meaningful action possible,
this of  course being a central question for the thesis. As we have already seen 
both Butler (2005) and Halpern (2017) envisage the acting subject as having 
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become more and more questionable as a locus of  ethical, or indeed any, 
action. This does not in itself  place their projects in opposition to 
Goldmann’s, even if  it arguably poses a challenge for the continued possibility 
of  the tragic vision. 
When it comes to Foucault however, Goldmann (1980, pp. 43 – 44) positions 
his own humanist genetic structuralism in opposition to the theoretical 
antihumanism of  Foucault’s assault on the anthropological subject. On this 
point it is easy to see why Golmann has come to the conclusion he has as 
Foucault (e.g., 1984) is probably the most emphatic critic of  humanism we will
find if  we limit ourselves to authors cited in this thesis. The disavowal is 
mutual and explicit in this case, as Foucault saw Goldmann as well as his 
theoretical inspiration Lukács along with all “the Hegelians of  the 19th 
century” (Foucault, 1996, p. 60) as being reliant on the consciousness of  the 
human subject as the motor of  all historical change, a view he himself  
completely rejected. Leaving aside for the moment the issue of  whether or not
this view does justice to the positions of  all the Hegelians in question I will 
note that the stance on humanism taken by Goldmann is more or less the 
complete opposite of  Foucault’s. Goldmann’s argument is that when it comes 
to what he refers to as variously “human facts” (Goldmann, 1980, p. 43) or 
“significant structures” (Ibid., p. 75), referring here in other words to what is 
understood in this thesis by concepts, that it is questionable that we could 
expect to be able to interpret these if  we stray “beyond their functional 
relation to … anthropological subjects” (Ibid., pp. 43 – 44). In other words, he
sees the question of  the possibility of  meaning and intelligibility as tied to a 
specifically human subject. On this point I will however disagree with 
Goldmann, for the reason that I would argue that the we do not need to 
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resort to any kind of  theoretical humanism or anthropologism in order to 
retain the concept of  subjectivity, granted that this subjectivity is one that has 
come to appear as more and more circumscribed. 
Take for example Hegel, certainly a central influence on Goldmann both 
directly and in an indirect fashion by way of  Marx and Lukács (e.g., 
Goldmann, 1970, p. 5). The prominent french scholar of  Hegel Jean 
Hyppolite argues that Hegel should not be seen as equating subjectivity with 
humanity, but that he rather prioritizes the question of  being in a more 
general sense (Güven, 2005, p. 171). Stefanos Geroulanos (2010, p. 298)  in his
turn points out that while Hyppolite in his discussions of  Hegel still sees the 
questions of  subjectivity as relevant for philosophical inquiry he nonetheless 
simultaneously sees the subject as being perpetually under threat of  being 
undermined and furthermore that humanism cannot offer the solution to this 
state of  affairs; indeed he asserts that subjectivity “holds no priority and no 
capacity for independent action” (Ibid., p. 302) while simultaneously “putting 
man in suspension” (Ibid.), as Geroulanos puts it.
Geroulanos writes here about a turn in french philosophy during the time 
between the two World Wars that he terms “antifoundational realism” (Ibid., 
p. 51), whereby any transcendence on the part of  man in regard to nature or 
to the world in general was rejected (Ibid., pp. 51 – 52). What was rejected 
here as well, as a necessary corollary, was any hope for radical change 
emerging from some sort of  human essence or purely human subject (Ibid.) 
Therefore I argue that, contra Goldmann, it is possible to study worldviews 
and meaningful structures without resorting to any kind of  humanism, seeing 
as the Hegelian theoretical basis Goldmann builds on can clearly be wielded to
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arrive at conclusions that make the question of  humanity irrelevant. This all 
being said, I will also claim that a Hegelian Marxist approach such as 
Goldmann’s should not be seen as necessarily incompatible with deeply 
skeptic stances toward subjectivity, seeing as marxisant theorists like Hyppolite
and Halpern clearly draw on Hegel and Marx in their critique of  more naive 
conceptions of  subjectivity. Moreover I would argue that Goldmann’s 
conception of  subjectivity is far from a naive one for that matter, one of  the 
central themes of  the Hidden God (1970) is after all the impossible and 
irresoluble demands tragedy places on action.
This detour into the dilemma of  theoretical humanism contra antihumanism 
has been undertaken mainly as an attempt to clarify the position of  this thesis 
on this issue, seeing as I regard it as perhaps the most central point of  conflict
within the theoretical framework of  this thesis. While this disagreement on 
the level of  theory may be of  secondary importance in comparison to the 
charting out of  the contradictions existing within the situation faced by the 
caregivers themselves I still see it as one worth addressing, not least because 
the question of  the basis of  subjectivity is quite central in these more concrete
contradictions; the issue of  madness is after all central when it comes to the 
question of  subjectivation, whether or not the subject acting here is conceived
of  as specifically human or not (Güven, 2005, p. 33). I would also like to make
the maybe obvious point that the kind of  views presented above, where 
subjectivity is hopelessly circumscribed and self-contradictory, would seem 
fated to lead to very similar conclusions as those Halpern arrives at when he 
posits his crisis of  action. There is also of  course the obvious affinity between
these views and the conclusions Butler (2005) arrives at in their discussion of  
the limits of  the subject as a basis for meaningful action.  
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An intriguing account of  certain aspects of  tragedt is given by Blanchot 
(1993) in his discussion of  how Lukács’ Soul and Form and Goldmann’s 
aforementioned the Hidden God can help elucidate the thought of  Pascal. Here 
Blanchot writes about how the tragic vision of  Pascal makes the unknown, 
referring here to that which lies beyond the comprehension of  us as flawed 
human beings, into something absolutely separated from our capacity for 
reason (Ibid., pp. 96 – 105). In doing so, Blanchot notes, Pascal does not 
reserve any space for a mysticist conception of  the unknown where it would 
offer us access to a reason of  its own, the two are in other words kept as 
completely separate and irreconcilable spheres in the manner required by the 
absolute demands of  tragedy (Ibid., p. 98 – 99). Tragedy finds its expression in
the tension between these two incompatible yet indispensable requisites 
(Ibid.). 
I would argue that this view finds its counterpart in the conclusions drawn by 
Foucault in his treatment of  the question of  the relationship between reason 
and madness in the History of  Madness, presented earlier in this thesis, namely 
that madness is completely cut of  from reason, that madness is confined to 
itself  in supreme separation, “without an interlocutor, … collapsing before it 
ever reaches any formulation and returning without a fuss to the silence that it
never shook off ” (Foucault et al., 2006b, pp. xxxi – xxxii). Interestingly 
enough Pascal ended up being branded as an irrationalist by certain later 
interpreters, Lukács among them (Jay, 1984, p. 317) just to name one thinker 
relevant for this thesis. Foucault in his turn was of  course also accused of  
irrationally seeing hidden truths within madness as I have discussed earlier in 
the thesis. 
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But while the accusations against Foucault on this point would seem to be 
largely misdirected the same cannot as easily be said for Pascal; it should be 
noted that there exists a crucial difference between the standpoint of  Pascal 
and that of  the modern reason of  psychiatry, namely that Pascal clearly sees 
reason as having no primacy in relation to the unknowable (e.g., Goldmann, 
1970, p. 181; Blanchot, 1993, pp. 99 – 100, Foucault et al., 2006b, p. 35). The 
reason of  psychiatry on the other hand rejects everything that does not accede
to its standards, as has been discussed earlier in the thesis. While the 
distinction between reason and that which lies beyond the ken of  reason is 
central for both outlooks the way this distinction is mediated is fundamentally 
different. In other words, if  the outlooks of  the tragic vision and of  modern 
reason or rationality are each others counterparts then they are so by virtue of
being opposed to each other in content while sharing a formal similarity. 
Something similar can be observed when it comes to the question of  the 
relation between death and madness, as we will see in the discussion section 
of  the thesis. 
To briefly return to Foucault, I think it is relevant to here also mention that it 
would seem as if the standpoint Foucault attributes to Ferguson on the matter 
of  the role economical factors within society is closer to the stance taken by 
Marxists like Goldmann and Halpern than it is to Foucault’s own stance, as we
will see later on in the thesis (Foucault et al., 2008, pp. 291 – 316). This 
becomes relevant for this thesis by way of  the fact that Ferguson was one of  
the first scholars to notice the economical underpinnings of  the quandary 
facing tragedy and action, as Halpern (2017, pp. 29 – 74) shows. At the same 
time it should be mentioned that Halpern (1991, p. 15) sees it as being 
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possible to incorporate Foucault into the broader project of  Marxist critique, 
something which I am myself  of  course doing in this thesis. While Marxist 
analyses on civil society clearly differ from Foucault’s in significant ways it is 
interesting to see how similar some aspects of  his conceptualization of  the 
role of  civil society in our modern society is to Marx’s and to that of  Marxists.
These issues will be elaborated further on in the discussion section.      
4. Research Material
As mentioned earlier the research material for this thesis was gathered 
primarily through participant observation and secondarily by way of  loosely 
structured interviews. The reason for opting for this approach was that the 
participant observation offered a way to receive a broad picture of  the 
situation faced by the caregivers, simultaneously of  course offering insight 
into how they themselves perceived their situation. While it would have been 
possibly to, for instance, rely on written accounts to approach the subject of  
caregiving, thus doing away with the need for fieldwork, I am still convinced 
that the opportunity to observe how caregivers talked among their peers 
enabled me to get a better gauge regarding what parts of  their outlooks was 
shared by the other caregivers and what was idiosyncratic and specific to the 
situation of  individual caregivers.  The interviews on the other hand offered a 
way to inquire into specific topics that I was interested in hearing more about, 
as well as offering me a chance to speak with caregivers one on one. In the 
sections below are a description of  the material as well as an overview of  the 
content of  the research material. Further analysis of  the research material will 
naturally also be found under the discussion section of  the thesis. 
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4.1. General description of  the research material
The research material for this thesis was gathered through participant 
observation performed in connection with a peer support group for family 
members of  people diagnosed with mental health disorders. I took part in a 
total of  eight of  these meetings, the first three back in the late summer of  
2016 and the remaining five in the spring of  2019. The concrete research 
material is thus primarily composed of  the notes taken during these meetings 
and after them while reflecting, of  course supplemented by the less 
quantifiable impressions and memories I have of  the experience of  taking 
part in these meetings. 
During my participation in these support group meetings I attempted to take 
a more or less withdrawn approach, often sitting slightly to the side of  the 
main group and not taking part in the discussion unless I was directly referred 
to by the participants or the facilitator. There are some caveats however, I 
often found myself  engaged in small talk with the participants during the start
of  meetings and when one or several of  them asked me questions regarding 
the purpose of  me being there. In addition to this I generally arrived early to 
these meetings, leading to me often engaging in conversations with the 
facilitator of  the group before participants arrived. The insights gleaned from 
these conversations will surely have had an influence on this thesis. In addition
to the material produced through participant observation and accompanying 
conversations the research material is supplemented by three interviews that I 
did individually with three different participants on the recommendation of  
my original thesis supervisor. The interviews were open-ended but based on a 
loose number of  themes that I had come to see as especially interesting from 
the standpoint of  my thesis. The interviews vary in length from 12 to 19 
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minutes and were recorded and transcribed. Based on the terms agreed upon 
with the interviewees the transcriptions will not be reproduced in this thesis, 
instead their content will be discussed and paraphrased, in a similar manner to
how the content gleaned through participant observation will be presented. 
Three similar open-ended interviews were also performed with rehabilitees 
that took part in some of  the meetings but these will not be included as 
material for the thesis on the recommendation of  the thesis supervisor, seeing
as the subject of  the thesis is limited to the caregivers themselves. 
When it comes to the topic of  the limitations inherent in the research material
I will note that the fact that the notes on the observation portion of  the 
material are paraphrased versions of  earlier manual notes, themselves also 
only interpretations of  observations, combined with the fact that direct 
quotations from the transcribed interviews are not possible means that I am 
unable to directly cite statements made by the caregivers. As a result of  these 
circumstances the thesis is forced to rely on more generalized descriptions of  
the discussions had at the peer support group meetings. Fortunately this is not
a major issue seeing as the aim of  the thesis is to situate the caregivers as 
group socially and not to, for example, make an in-depth analysis of  the 
concrete social interactions taking place.  
4.2. General description of  the peer support group meetings
Since examining the group dynamics or the social interactions occurring in 
within the group meetings is not in itself  the focus of  this thesis and seeing as
the scope of  the thesis precludes an in-depth analysis of  these matters the 
description of  the group meetings will be kept relatively brief. It will however 
37
still be necessary to briefly examine this matter for the connections drawn 
between research material and conclusions to become comprehensible, 
especially in regard to practice of  doing a round. 
The peer support meetings took place in facilities belonging to an 
organization working for the benefit of  caregivers of  persons diagnosed with 
mental health disorders and illnesses, in a densely populated urban area in 
Finland. The peer support groups that serve as the access point of  this thesis 
were organized in two different ways, the first as a so called “open group” and
the second as a so called “closed group”. The open group was as its name 
implies open to any caregiver that wanted to join, without any prior 
registration, caregivers of  minors did however in practice not take part in the 
meetings of  this peer support group, seeing as they had their own groups. The
peer support group was also open-ended in a temporal sense, being an 
ongoing group that did not have a set end-point unlike certain of  the closed 
groups, gathering once every week. 
The closed group that I attended was also an ongoing, weekly group but was 
referred to as a closed group since it required that the participants would be 
informed of  any new joining members beforehand. Another difference 
between this closed group and the open one was that people with diagnosed, 
serious mental disorders also took part in it. The rest of  the participants of  
the closed group, the caregivers that is, were largely the same people that took 
part in the open group. Speaking broadly this means that the caregivers that 
took part in the meetings would generally meet once or twice a week in these 
kinds of  groups. Several of  the participants told me, both during interviews 
and during group discussions, that hey kept in touch with each other outside 
38
of  these meetings too. In the open group however it was perfectly acceptable 
for participants to not show up for extended periods of  time if  they decided 
to do so for whatever reason. The way the two different groups were 
structured did not deviate in ways other than those described above, they were
organized by the same facilitator and held in the same place as each other. The
way the groups met and discussed also did not deviate in any significant way. 
The physical location the meetings were held in had changed by the time I did 
my second round of  participatory observations but the layout of  the facilities 
remained broadly the same, a few coffee tables surrounded by sofas and 
armchairs all facing inward toward the middle point of  the room. Coffee, 
sandwiches and various snacks were served during the meetings. The way 
people conversed at the meetings varied according to how far along the 
meeting had come, often being more informal and broken up into several 
conversations between pairs of  participants at the start of  the meeting. At 
some point the facilitator would then signal that the meeting had properly 
started by suggesting that everyone do a round (Finnish: kierros). The way this 
worked was that he participants, one at a time, gave the rest of  the group a 
sort of  update on their general life situation, telling the other participants how
their ill family member was faring, how they felt about their current situation 
and so on. What was said varied a lot in nature and was left to the participants
themselves to formulate freely, as one participant put it they would share 
everything between their deepest sorrows and their greatest joys at these 
meetings. While one participant talked in the manner described above the 
others would serve as their audience, sometimes however asking clarifying 
questions and the like, with the facilitator usually posing more of  these 
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questions than the rest. When the round was over the conversation would 
generally return to being somewhat more informal once again. 
While the facilitator could thus be said to have a specific role in structuring 
the discussion in the group her approach could otherwise be described as 
relatively hands-off, beyond the context of  the rounds her interventions were 
usually limited to asking follow-up questions, ensuring that recently arriving 
participants got a chance to enter the discussion and the like. At several 
different points during my participant observation the caregivers would make 
sure that I understood that they saw the group facilitator as one of  them 
rather than as merely a representative for the association, as a healthcare 
professional or as an outsider in some other way. 
During these meetings participants would often come and go throughout, few
if  any participants would remain for the entirety of  the nearly four hours that 
these meetings lasted, facilitator notwithstanding. The number of  participants 
of  course also varied between the different times I was present, with between 
as few as a handful and as many as several dozen participants taking the 
course during the course of  one meeting. The participants generally only ever 
referred to themselves and to each other with their first names during the 
meetings. This was also the case when introducing themselves to first-time 
participants of  the meetings, of  which there were a couple during the time I 
was present, and when they introduced themselves to me. 
When looking at the demographic composition of  the group participants a 
few matters have to be mentioned for reasons of  context. Firstly, it should be 
mentioned that with the exception of  exactly one participant during all of  the 
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time I spent doing participant observation all the people participating in the 
group as caregivers were women. The facilitator of  the group, who remained 
the same throughout the time I performed my participatory observation, was 
also a woman. The reasons that so few men were attending the group was also
something that was discussed several times during the meetings. As an aside I 
want to point out here that this state of  affairs seems to be in some way 
characteristic for caregivers in general, the gendered aspects of  caregiving has 
been noted by prior researchers such as Stengård (2005, pp. 23 – 25) who cites
studies that show that 81 – 87% of  Finnish caregivers caring for a family 
member diagnosed with a mental illness or disorder were women. While the 
gendered aspect of  caregiving will not be exhaustively analyzed in this reason 
because of  reasons of  scope I do want to point out here that the lopsided 
gender distribution of  the meetings was discussed by the participants and by 
the facilitator, with the consensus being that it would be necessary and 
desirable to have men become more involved in peer support activities. 
Secondly, regarding the question of  the age of  the caregivers I want to point 
out that the typical caregiver would be the mother of  an adult son or daughter
who often had been diagnosed with a mental disorder a decade or longer ago, 
which naturally means that the age of  the caregivers would on average appear 
to be somewhere around the mid forties or early fifties. In discussions with 
staff  of  the association and with certain participants they gave as a reason for 
this the simple fact that participants would often continue taking part in the 
peer support meetings and other activities organized by the association for 
years upon years, something that certainly held true for several of  the 
participants of  the group I took part in. This naturally meant that there would
be a certain skewing towards higher average age in the participants over time. 
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It should also be mentioned that several of  the participants also did different 
kinds of  volunteer work for the association organizing the peer support group
meetings, this work varied from acting as experts by experience, as peer 
support coordinators,  handling social media for the association, helping to set
up support group meetings, holding various positions of  trust within the 
association and so on. 
4.3. On the content of  the research material
As mentioned above, by far the most common familial relation between 
caregiver and afflicted family member within these peer support groups seems
to be that the caregiver is a parent, usually mother, of  an adult child diagnosed
with a mental disorder. In some cases however the caregiver is a friend, 
spouse, sibling or adult child of  a disordered parent. As mentioned earlier 
caregivers of  minors were not present at the meetings I attended. By way of  
listening to the group discussions and also through conversations with people 
working for the association I learned that the people going to these peer 
support groups are usually caregivers to people suffering from a subset of  
more severe disorders or illnesses, more specifically bipolar disorder, 
schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia or severe forms of  depression. While 
this should not be seen as a comprehensive or definite list I include it to give 
some sense of  the medical context. It also seemed to be a common theme 
that the afflicted family members in question had gone through a psychosis at 
some point in their lives. 
A typical narration told by a caregiver on the subject of  how they came to 
partake in the peer support group meetings would often involve them seeking 
out such a group or some other form of  peer support as a response to feeling 
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completely at a loss in regard to their situation as a caregiver. Some expressed 
feeling that they could not see how they could even be alive if  it were not for 
support groups such as this one, others talked about still feeling as if  they are 
completely unable to deal with their situation but simultaneously not being 
able to imagine ever ceasing to participate in the meetings. A common way to 
describe the initial onset of  the disorder that came to define their situation is 
that it felt as if  a disaster had occurred and that the way they had lived before 
the madness was completely obsolete; ethical guidelines and commonsense 
approaches that had seemed obvious before no longer applied to their 
situation. 
The topic of  suicidal or otherwise self-destructive family members was a 
common one, with caregivers talking about having to be constantly vigilant in 
case their kin would choose to try to end their life. Even if  the family 
members’ threats to kill themselves did not escalate into actual attempts this 
of  course did not mean that the caregivers would be spared the grueling 
ordeal of  having to constantly worry that a loved one might die at any 
moment. A couple of  the caregivers expressed a fatalistic outlook on this 
matter, having come to be convinced that there would be nothing they could 
do if  their family members ever really decided to end their own life. The 
facilitator would sometimes note on this matter that it is a common 
occurrence for people with the kinds of  diagnoses possessed by the afflicted 
family members to threaten to kill themselves, some of  the participants 
expressed that they could understand this on a mental level but that they still 
could never get used to the self-destructivity of  their kin. Several of  the 
caregivers also had family members who in addition to having been diagnosed 
with one or more mental disorders also suffered from problems related to 
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substance use, this being another common reason for worrying about the 
well-being of  the family member in question.  
A common subject of  discussion among the caregivers was the feeling of  
being alienated from friends, co-workers and acquaintances who lacked insight
into what a mental health related diagnosis entailed.  The border drawn 
between caregivers and those who did not have family, friends or kin suffering
from these disorders was quite sharp, a common sentiment was that these 
kind of  “outsiders” could never have a proper understanding of  the 
difficulties caregivers face. One of  the interviewees told me that she had lost 
several friendships because of  this, the former friends in question having 
blamed her for her son’s illness and also blamed the son for supposedly “just 
being lazy”. This was echoed in the group discussions, participants often 
spoke about being blamed for their family members’ disorders. The concept 
of  “stigma” (Finnish: leima) was often utilized by the participants when 
discussing these matters. This was certainly also reflected in how the 
caregivers spoke about the representants of  the medical profession they 
interacted with, where there, once gain, seemed to exist a stable consensus 
among the caregivers as to how they perceived the expectations psychiatrists 
and other medical professionals had toward them. These expectations were 
framed by the caregivers as having little grounding in the daily lives of  those 
diagnosed with mental illnesses and disorders, and especially as being ill suited
for the purpose of  involving the family members of  their patients.
One subject that came up frequently in the discussion group meetings was the
question of  the economical situation of  the caregivers and their kin. The most
common way this subject was broached was in relation to questions of  how 
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afflicted family members struggled with poverty, often having trouble keeping 
their economical affairs in order, something which according to the accounts 
of  the caregivers was primarily caused by aspects of  their disorder. A question
often discussed, clearly seen as a difficult one, was whether or not and to what
extent caregivers should economically support their afflicted adult children. 
The caregivers also discussed their own economic troubles, it was not unusual 
that they tied their hardships on this front to them having to act as caregiver. 
Many of  them talked about struggling economically. This quandary also tied 
into discussions of  what the facilitator and several participants referred to as 
“coddling” (Finnish: hyysääminen), meaning behavior aiming at supporting 
the afflicted family member that turns out to be either counterproductive, 
excessive or a serious strain on the well-being of  the caregiver themselves. 
Here caregivers expressed feeling tremendous amounts of  strain in attempting
to find the right course of  action to take, in the balancing of  their own well-
being, the well-being of  their kin and other obligations they had in their daily 
lives. 
I want to point out that this aspect, the discussion of  boundaries and of  
where to draw the line in regard to their ill family members, was one common 
to several of  the more difficult topics discussed at the meetings, for example 
when talking about how to respond to suicide threats, another topic clearly 
seen by some caregivers as being difficult to ever reconcile themselves with. 
An important aspect of  the discussion of  boundaries was that no caregiver 
ever as far as I could tell ever explicitly told another exactly where to draw the 
line, there appeared to be a shared understanding that it would be futile to 
attempt to apply standards that worked for one caregiver or in one situation to
the situation faced by another caregiver. This was also emphasized by 
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caregivers in the interviews and in conversation with me, they seemed to want 
to make sure that I understood that they did not moralize or try to school 
each other. At the same time however they appeared to all share an 
understanding of  their situation as caregivers, something they were equally 
vocal about ensuring that I understood. As one caregiver put it, she only had 
to say half  a word to make the other caregivers understand what she was 
talking about when discussing the troubles she faced.  
The subject of  what an improvement in their lot might actually mean for 
caregivers came up often during discussions, ranging from hopes of  
psychiatric institutions developing better practices for including family 
members in their interventions to hoping for a broader shift in how society 
treated those diagnosed as mentally ill and their kin. By way of  example, one 
concrete change caregivers saw as being desirable was seeing mental health-
related diagnoses be treated no different from somatic diagnoses, that there 
would be no more shame in having a broken leg than in having a fractured 
psyche, as one participant put it. 
I do therefore want to point out that while the situation facing the caregivers 
would seem to present a bewildering challenge to a sociologist trying to do 
justice to the complexities at play the outlook of  the caregivers themselves 
rarely betrayed any kind of  bewilderment. On the contrary, in the ways the 
caregivers spoke about the problems they faced in their daily lives as a result 
of  their situation I very rarely observed any questioning of  whether or not 
they should care for their afflicted kin, on the whole it seemed to me as if  
everyone present at the peer support meetings shared a conviction that not 
caring for their family members was out of  the question from the get-go. 
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While the caregivers often expressed not being able to ever come to terms 
completely with their situation it struck me that they never expressed out loud
any intent of  ever stopping caring for their kin altogether. This being said, this
does not mean that there were no complex quandaries that the caregivers had 
to navigate, as I will discuss later on in the thesis certain apparently irresoluble
contradictions seem to me to be characteristic to the situation the caregivers 
find themselves in. 
5. Method and Methodology
While the theoretical framework section of  the thesis already largely broaches 
the subject of  the thesis’ methodological underpinnings I will use this section 
to give something of  a summary of  the concrete implications of  the 
theoretical framework in addition to describing the process of  analyzing the 
material. The brief  explanation is that this thesis is a qualitative study utilizing 
ethnographic methods in acquiring its research material while relying on 
Marxist critique, the sociological and philosophical study of  literature and 
drama as well as positioning itself  as simultaneously adjacent to and partially 
opposed to Foucaultian genealogical studies. To facilitate this kind of  critical 
analysis the research material naturally had to be processed in some form. In 
regard to the material derived from participant observation this entailed first 
writing down the raw notes in a text document to make the material more 
approachable. In conjunction with this some informal commentary, early 
thoughts on the findings and similar were added. After this the material was 
grouped according to subject. As mentioned earlier the interviews were 
transcribed, these were also coded using ATLAS.ti in order to get a better 
overview. 
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As I have alluded to earlier in the thesis my examination of  the situation of  
caregivers shares a general outline with the approach taken by Goldmann in 
the Hidden God, with the major caveat that my approach differs from 
Goldmann’s in drawing methodologically on the work of  more recent Marxist 
writers, mainly of  course on Halpern but also on the work of  Vernant (e.g., 
Vernant, 1988). Goldmann (1970; 1980), who referred to his methodology as 
genetic structuralism, foregrounded the importance of  a humanistic form of  
Marxism and the work of  the psychologist Jean Piaget for his work. The 
methodology of  this thesis on the other hand draws on another form of  
Marxist critique, one that as mentioned earlier (Halpern, 1991) shares some 
similarities to Foucault’s genealogical inquiries and to certain associated 
modern currents in continental philosophy, as exemplified here by for instance
the work of  Hyppolite, Butler and Blanchot. That being said, I would argue 
that many of  Goldmann’s methodological considerations apply to this thesis 
as well, as we will see. I have also of  course opted for using some of  his 
terminology,  primarily by writing about the tragic vision and about 
worldviews. 
With Goldmann (1980) describing his project as a form of  heterodox 
structuralism, with Halpern (1991, p. 6) drawing on the work of  the structural 
Marxist Louis Althusser and with Vernant (1988, pp. 7 – 10) utilizing 
structural analysis in his research it would seem safe to say that most if  not all 
of the Marxist authors central for the analysis performed in this thesis are all 
in some way adjacent to structuralism in their inquiries. Seeing as Goldmann 
and Halpern are the central inspirations for the methodological approach of  
the thesis we could perhaps describe its methodology as being a form of  
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structural, materialist critique of  the preconditions of  meaningful and 
intelligible shared action. 
What is attempted here in this thesis is, as has been previously implied, not to 
give detailed empirical analyses of  the individual life stories of  peer support 
group participants and subsequent analyzes of  these but rather to find and 
elucidate the underlying similarity binding together all the disparate accounts 
given at the peer support group meetings, the shared basis required for the 
peer support group participants to constitute and envision themselves as a 
group at all. It is only by identifying these underlying, material preconditions 
that we will be able to say that we can know which viewpoints espoused by 
the participants form a necessary part of  their worldviews a group and what is
merely accidental or arbitrary. Following the example of  Goldmann, Halpern 
and the Foucault of History of  Madness I have also drawn on examples from 
literature and drama in order to develop my argument on this point, what 
Goldmann (1980) terms the sociology of  literature has also served as an 
inspiration for the methodological format of  the thesis. 
Goldmann warns sociologists not to rely on too abstract concepts too 
recklessly as every particular social-historical instance where said abstract 
concept can be identified has to be thoroughly historicized and be analyzed 
from the point of  view of  its position within a given social-historical totality if
we are to be able to justify using it (Goldmann, 1980, pp. 63 – 64). Only then 
can the different instances where the concept becomes applicable be put into 
relation with each other and only then can the development of  the concept 
throughout history be traced (Ibid.). For example, if  we are to speak of  
tragedy we would then have to treat the tragedy of  the Greeks as a completely
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different concept from that of  the tragedy of  Racine, both of  which would be
far removed from any contemporary conceptualization of  tragedy. These 
distinctions would have to be upheld until we have gone through the grueling 
work of  explaining the relation between these different tragedies and their 
corresponding material bases. 
Interestingly enough this approach would appear to be not that far removed 
from the one Foucault employed in History of  Madness, where he gave an 
account of  different conceptions of  madness as illustrated with various 
examples derived, among others, from literary and theatrical sources much like
Goldmann does in the Hidden God (Peltonen, 2004, pp. 209 – 210). What he 
also did was however that he examined “how a person defined as mad was 
separated from others and moved outside the community” (Ibid., p. 210), in 
other words Foucault examined the relationship between the mad as a social 
group and the rest of  society, with the difference in regard to Goldmann that 
he did this primarily with an eye toward practices and institutions whereas 
Goldmann focused primarily on class relations, as has been discussed in the 
theory section of  the thesis. 
As the kind of  exhaustive historicization and philosophical-conceptual 
investigation that would be necessary to truly be able to pass the high standard
for sociological research set by Goldmann above is far beyond the scope of  
any single thesis I will be forced to rely on the work of  earlier scholars on this 
point. Fortunately for us however the subject of  tragedy and most of  the 
other central concepts employed in the thesis, such as those of  the state, the 
family and madness to name a couple, have been quite thoroughly examined 
by scholars representing diverse disciplines. With this in mind and drawing on 
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Halpern, as I have done extensively in this thesis, I will attempt to evade the 
opposing pitfalls of  both an excessive abstraction and a blinkered empiricism 
by trying to maintain a kind of  “state of  creative tension” (Halpern, 1991, p. 
13) between the different instantiations of  the concepts I am utilizing here. In 
order to do this I have relied on what may at first appear as somewhat abstract
concepts with the intention of  clarifying my usage as the thesis proceeds; by 
presenting the ways in which various sociologists, philosophers and others 
have understood the concepts I am using here I hope to be able to show the 
tensions and contradictions arising within and between these in a way that 
allows us to better understand the situation faced by the caregivers I have 
studied here, allowing us to historicize their situation, putting it into a wider 
social-historical context. 
The insistence on not succumbing to hopeless abstraction is crucial here. 
Noting that caregivers experience their familial situation as being somehow 
irresolvable under presently existing societal conditions does not on its own 
say anything about the actual impasse caregivers face. If  one wants to arrive at
a deeper understanding of  the social-historical origins of  the current 
predicament of  caregivers it would require one to elucidate exactly what it is 
that they are unable to resolve, so as to be able to pinpoint how the specific 
social institutions involved have become the locus of  this deadlock. It will also
be necessary to try to offer a picture of  what a resolution would entail here in 
the first place, even if  this solution will turn out to be the fundamental 
overturning of  the present state of  things (e.g., Halpern, 2017, p. 199). 
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6. Discussion
In this section of  the thesis the central quandaries of  the research are laid out.
This section will be ordered according to subject matter but I have also 
attempted to sequence them in a way that helps me lay out my argument in as 
straightforward a way as possible. While certain of  the discussions here might 
start out on a very abstract level I hope that I will have been able to show how
these discussions are relevant for the situation of  caregivers by the end of  the 
thesis. 
6.1. Madness, death, tragedy 
The subject of  madness also becomes interesting for us on account of  its 
inseparability from death and thus from tragedy, as has been alluded to earlier 
in the framework section of  the thesis. As Güven (2005) explains, death and 
madness are clearly associated for Foucault in his History of  Madness, “they 
articulate one and the same experience. What is experienced in madness and 
death is the ‘nothingness of  existence.’ ” (Ibid., p. 124). Recognition of  the 
affinity shared between death and madness as problems for philosophy trace 
their way further back than to Foucault’s inquiry, appearing among other in 
the work of  Hegel (Ibid., p. 45), with Foucault himself  noting that Georges 
Bataille and Maurice Blanchot served as inspirations for him in recognizing 
the shared status of  madness and death as relevant for understanding   
“experiences on the edge” (Foucault & Lotringer, 1996, p. 409). This limit 
experience is surely relevant for the caregivers if  not directly then by way of  
their afflicted family members. But how does this limit experience manifest 
itself  in practice? According to Blanchot madness in particular acts as “the 
limit which every language holds” (Blanchot & Holland, 1995, p. 126), a limit 
that is impossible to set down once and for all or even be found at all before 
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one has already transgressed it. I would argue that this is echoed in the attitude
caregivers are forced to take on in regard to their mad kin; as we will see the 
impossibility of  setting down a workable framework of  ethics once and for all
is an inescapable effect of  the fact that the situation of  caregivers appears to 
be incapable of  being solved under presently reigning conditions. 
This failure to ever achieve any form of  final reconciliation is in turn echoed 
in the realm of  the tragic. Foucault notes that the fundamental aspect of  
tragedy for Racine is the “confrontation between the two irreconcilable 
kingdoms” (Foucault et al., 2006b, p. 245), more or less echoing Goldmann 
(1970) on this point. Focusing especially on Racine’s Andromaque, Foucault 
goes on to conceptualize these two irreconcilable realms as day and night, 
reason and sense versus nothingness and blind error, crucially identifying this 
division as being relevant for the experience of  madness as well (Ibid., pp. 242
– 245). What is shared between the views on tragedy and madness presented 
here is a certain kind of  awareness of  the limits of  human reason, a limit that 
can never be crossed (Ibid.). But while day and night mirror each other within 
the context of  17th century tragedy, doing so in a way that allows meaningful 
action to take place,  the same does not hold true for conceptions of  madness
in that same historical context (Ibid.). For while a “tragic character found in 
the night the dark truths of  daytime” (Ibid., p. 245) those deemed mad “by 
way of  contrast, in daylight, finds only the inconsistency of  the figures of  the 
night” (Ibid.), meaning that the mad are cut off  from being intelligible in the 
way tragic drama is intelligible for its audience; while the acts of  a tragic 
character always held the utmost amount of  meaning the doings of  the mad 
were entirely meaningless. Foucault thus sees madness as having been 
separated from the realm of  tragedy since the end of  the 17th century in 
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France, which he in turn associates with a corresponding development in the 
treatment of  those considered mad, namely the confinement and exclusion of
them, which he describes as “the accomplishment of  the nothingness that was
madness in death” (Ibid., p. 250). For Foucault this exclusion, where “madness
disappeared from tragic action” (Ibid., p. 246), is best exemplified by the 
deathlike madness of  Orestes in Andromaque whose subsequent disappearance 
from the realm of  the living mirrors the changing stance taken toward the 
mad in France at the time the play was written. 
Goldmann (1970, pp. 320 – 322), in his own analysis of  the same play notes 
that for the most characteristically tragic character in it, that of  course being 
Andromache, the only way for her to hold true to the competing claims of  the
irreconcilable values she holds is to embrace death; only by dying can 
Andromache have imbued her life with definite meaning. But the rest of  
characters in the play are beneath tragic grandeur, even if  they die or succumb
to a living death in madness like Orestes does their deaths do not serve to 
uphold any values, their deaths are ultimately meaningless (Ibid.). Here we 
reach similar conclusions as Foucault in his own interpretation, namely that 
death or madness do not necessarily guarantee meaning. We could say, 
drawing on Halpern, that while death on the one hand typically enables 
meaningful action within tragic drama it is also capable of  becoming 
associated with the very essence of  meaninglessness in the world of  material 
life, as we see here with the case of  madness in the classical era in France. 
Here, I would argue, the stance taken on madness by Foucault in the History of
Madness becomes relevant again, the futility of  trying to find a primordial 
madness is echoed by the futility of  hoping for some fundamental sense of  
the tragic that could be harnessed for the benefit of  creating a stable basis for 
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a framework of  ethics. Tragedy in Foucault’s analysis of  it is as elusive and 
fleeting as it appears to be in Halpern’s investigations. At this point I also want
to yet again bring up Goldmann’s (1970; 1980) warnings about the danger of  
relying on too abstract concepts, or of  expecting a meaningful structure such 
as that of  “tragedy” to possess some internal force ensuring its continuous 
existence. This in turn of  course carries certain implications for the situation 
of  caregivers. 
I would argue, with the above discussion in mind, that it would be reckless to 
see the solution to the caregivers’ situation as being found in some affirmation
of  the tragic; even if  we agree with Halpern that the possibility for meaningful
action or for tragedy is eroding this should not mean that we conclude that 
the solution to this quandary lies in returning to some earlier, more potent and
primordial sense of  tragedy. In fact, as Vernant (1988, pp. 211 – 215; cf., 
Halpern, 2017, pp. 97 – 98) notes, even in the times of  Sophocles or 
Euripides tragedians set their plays in a long-gone mythic time where heroes 
acted unhindered by the restricting demands of  the polis where the authors of
the plays and their audiences lived their lives, much like Racine did by 
returning to the era of  Greek myth in Andromaque. Meaningful action has 
been seen as being in some way unattainable for a very long time and merely 
trying to more resolutely affirm death or madness would seem to be a very 
unreliable way to escape this quandary at best. 
6.2. Civil society
But if  we cannot rely on any eternal or fundamental concepts to help us out 
here then where will we find the concepts needed for making sense of  the 
situation the caregivers face? In this section I will write about one concept that
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might help us out in this regard, namely that of  civil society. In the section on 
the theoretical framework of  the thesis Ferguson and his examination of  civil 
society was discussed, as was Foucault's analysis of  it and the influence it had 
on the thought of  Marx and Marxists. However, to understand how the 
Marxists cited in this thesis conceive of  the relationship between civil society 
and the other spheres of  society we have to briefly mention Hegel’s thoughts 
on this matter. As Halpern (2017, pp. 186 – 187) explains, Hegel partitions the
society of  his time into three spheres, more specifically those of  the family, 
the state and civil society. This partition and its attendant conception of  civil 
society, while different from Ferguson’s analysis of  civil society, is heavily 
indebted to it all the same (Hill, 2010). What is of  interest here in the context 
of  this thesis is how Hegel’s work has come to influence contemporary 
conceptions of  both family and civil society, both of  which are of  course 
highly relevant subjects for us. While the reason why the sphere of  the family 
is relevant here hardly needs to be elaborated on it will be be necessary to here
lay out some of  the ways in which civil society becomes relevant when 
examining the social conditions caregivers have to operate under.
 In Halpern’s (2017, pp. 11, 180 – 187) analysis of  the issue at hand civil 
society becomes crucial for our understanding of  modern conceptions of  
tragedy, writing that Hegel would be unable to respond to the crisis of  action 
within bourgeois society if  he did not have recourse to the concept of  civil 
society. While the other two older spheres, those of  the family and of  the 
state, existed in some form already for the ancient Greeks and sufficed to 
explain the tragic conflicts of  their time, as we will see in the discussion on 
Antigone, this has no longer been the case at least since the time when the 
political economists of  the Scottish Enlightenment identified the role 
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commercial interests had in driving the fundamental conflicts within society 
(Ibid.). The concept of  civil society was required to make sense of  the 
disparate and complexly interconnected social groups of  modern society, it 
was required in order to make them intelligible. This is true even for a group 
like that of  the caregivers discussed in this thesis, even as it might seem 
intuitive to lump them into the sphere of  the family then we would still have 
to give an answer to the question of  which other sphere it is that they are in 
conflict with. Unless we argue that all their troubles are either caused by the 
state or by forces utterly beyond our understanding then we need to rely on a 
conception of  society more complex than that of  the ancient Greeks. 
While he clearly saw use in civil society as concept it is important to note that 
Hegel did however not see actually existing civil society as in itself  being any 
kind of  solution to anything. Halpern (Ibid., pp. 13, 183 – 185) discusses the 
concept of  Hegel’s cunning of  reason, pointing out its similarity and 
indebtedness to Smith’s concept of  the invisible hand, noting that when 
applied to the sphere of  civil society these two concepts imply the existence 
of  a certain kind of  capacity for civil society to correct itself. However, in the 
case of  Hegel this capacity is seen as explicitly incapable of  ever actually 
resolving or transcending these limitations through its own means (Ibid., 189).
What he offers instead is the possibility of  reconciliation by ethical means, 
through what he terms sittlichkeit. For Hegel a stable framework of  ethical 
freedom is thus a possibility under bourgeois society (Ibid., p. 199). As 
Halpern (Ibid.) notes this is of  course rejected by Marx, who sees any 
meaningful freedom as being possible only once the divisions between the 
different spheres of  society are destroyed alongside the market. Radical 
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upheaval lies between the present state of  things and the overcoming of  the 
contradictions we face. 
With this in mind it is surely worth questioning to what extent the Hegelian 
family-state-civil society tripartite division of  modern society that I will use 
here as a kind of  jumping-off  point is in any way worth chaining ourselves to 
as we study the subject of  kinship. While this is certainly a reasonable question
I will within the context of  this thesis still use this framework, seeing as it 
might help point toward the inherent limits of  these terms and towards the 
social conflict points where their inadequacy as explanatory schemata become 
more apparent. In doing this I am drawing on the work of  Butler (2000) who 
studies the limits of  ancient Greek conceptions of  society through her reading
of  Antigone. 
6.3. The difficult question of  family – Antigone
The possibility of  certain of  social conflicts being irresolvable is far from a 
modern quandary. In his discussion of  Antigone Halpern (2017, p. 188) argues, 
citing Butler’s (2000) analysis of  the same play,  that it is possible to read the 
play as acknowledging the lack of  internal unity within the competing ethical 
claims put forward by Antigone and Creon. This reading, he notes,  is 
compatible with the Hegelian view, that of  the play as a portrayal of  the 
conflict between family and state but on the other hand it opens up questions 
about the possibility of  resolving social conflicts between different spheres of
the social world by way of  ethical means (Halpern, 2017, pp. 184 – 188). This 
would undermine the capacity of  sittlichkeit to provide the grounds for a 
resolution of  the conflicts arising between these spheres as envisaged by 
Hegel (e.g,. Ibid., p. 199, Lukács, 1975, pp. 378 – 379), thus in turn making 
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less plausible any hope of  these conflicts being resolvable while this partition 
of  the social world endures. One could also draw the conclusion that in so far 
as this reading is coherent it makes vast swathes of  currently existing ethical 
frameworks suspect, as any ethics claiming the institutions of  family or state 
as its ground would be fundamentally ungrounded. This interpretation would 
appear to fit together well with how the caregivers appeared to see ethical 
guidelines as in some sense provisional and at risk of  becoming useless at a 
later date or under different circumstances. 
For Butler (2000) this aforementioned lack of  self-enclosure within the ethical
frameworks serving as its base is one of  the most central problems raised by 
the play, as we will see. In Butler’s reading, the supposedly discrete spheres of  
family and state turn out to be anything but, with them noting that:
 Not only does the state presuppose kinship and kinship presuppose 
 the state but ‘acts’ that are performed in the name of  the one principle  
 take place in the idiom of  the other … thus bringing into crisis the  
 stability of  the conceptual distinction between them.
 (Butler, 2000, pp. 11 – 12)
This reading raises interesting questions about the internal coherence of  
tragedy. If  tragedy contains a hidden admission of  the fact that the 
supposedly coherent ethical claims made by the subjects of  tragedy are in fact 
anything but coherent or unified (Halpern, 2017, p. 188) then tragedy does in 
fact contain within itself  the admission of  its own incompleteness and 
inability of  ever providing complete closure.
By now I should probably attempt to clarify how I argue that the situation of  
the caregivers relates to that of  Antigone in a formal manner. The central 
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source of  conflict in Antigone is of  course Antigone’s determination to have 
her dead brother Polynices buried against the wishes of  Creon, ruler of  
Thebes. The impetus for her actions are in other words to care for her, in this 
case dead, family member even though this act is forbidden by the laws of  her
city. In the case of  the caregivers they also wish to care for a family member, 
in this case one who is mad. While the caregivers are of  course not forbidden 
from attending to their stricken kin there was, as I have alluded to earlier, a 
widely shared sentiment among the caregivers that the norms reigning in 
society at large conflicted with the situation they found themselves in. In fact, 
through conversations I took part in both at the peer support group meetings 
and with people working for the caregiver’s association, it became apparent 
that the very existence of  the peer support group was painted by them as 
being brought about by a shared experience among the caregivers of  not 
having had their dedication toward their ill family members recognized, their 
commitment to caring for their kin not getting any acknowledgment from 
psychiatric institutions or from any other quarter for that matter.
This thesis has thus far focused on the problems arising out of  the situation 
of  families overwhelmed by madness but if  the family has received extensive 
attention here the same cannot be said for its counterpart in the tragedy of  
Antigone, namely the state. It is interesting to see how similar the fate of  the 
family is to that of  the state in Halpern’s analysis, with him showing that since 
the days of  Ferguson, Smith and the Scottish enlightenment the power of  the 
sovereign and of  the state has been seen as being under threat or being 
subservient to commercial society (Halpern, 2017, pp. 35 – 38). Drawing on 
Foucault, Halpern argues that from the point of  view of  the political 
economy of  the time the sovereign was seen as completely powerless over the 
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sphere of  the economical, its influence being limited to serving as a support 
structure for the running of  the economy, in other words reduced to the role 
of  what Foucault calls “governmentality” (Ibid., p. 37). Thus the 
predominance of  economic concerns have made state intervention less 
feasible, thus deprioritizing shared political action. 
At first glance this would seem to lead us toward the conclusion that the 
remaining sphere in our triad of  social spheres, that being of  course the 
family, might serve as a point of  resistance against the onslaught of  civil 
society where the state has proved to be inadequate, putting our hope in 
Antigone where Creon has failed so to speak. But this would of  course be 
difficult to square with the manifold challenges faced by the family, as Butler 
(2000, pp. 22 – 24) notes it would be a mistake to expect to be able to take for 
granted family or kinship as a foundation or as a guiding star, in much the 
same way as we have seen that death or madness cannot serve such a purpose 
either. The caregivers I observed at the meetings were in any case already 
engaged in the work of  caring for their afflicted kin and showed no doubt 
about continuing to do so. The kind of  affirmation of  the family or of  
kinship that Butler criticizes as doomed would appear to be irrelevant from 
the get go when it comes to the case of  these caregivers, their problems are 
after all certainly not caused by too little attachment to the values of  family 
and kinship. 
6.4. The situation of  caregivers as ongoing crisis 
But if  every concept, meaningful structure or ethical framework we examine is
starting to seem either contingent, unfounded or obsolete then can we not 
expect this to mean that tragic or meaningful action was doomed from the 
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start? While this kind of  pessimism is surely to some extent warranted I would
argue that this is not necessarily the case. In Hegel’s conception of  it, Kain 
writes, tragedy requires a conflict between two equally valid ethical 
frameworks (Kain, 2005, p. 151). While the underlying conflict remains 
intractable and even destructive from the standpoint of  these frameworks this
crisis will, in time, lead to “the emergence of  a higher moral principle” (Ibid.) 
offering a resolution. It is interesting to note that tragedy allows Hegel to 
account for the empirical existence of  ethical conflicts, even with situations 
where ethical frameworks collapse and become untenable. “Tragedy means 
the collapse of  the great, the master, the whole ethical world” (Ibid.), yet even 
as it collapses it opens up new possibilities for ethical conduct. This clearly has
relevance for the situation of  caregivers, if  the conclusions of  this thesis are 
correct in identifying the situation of  the caregivers as being caught up in a 
crisis threatening to destabilize the spheres of  the family and the state. 
This state of  affairs seems to need to be addressed if  we are to be able to 
account for the continued possibility of  holding on to coherent ethical 
frameworks, with the possibility of  action waning it would seem like the 
capacity for subjects to take ethically meaningful action would have to wane 
with it correspondingly. In Halpern’s argument the crisis of  action threatens to
spill over into a crisis of  the subject, with him noting that incapability of  
taking action puts “the subject in the position of  spectator” (Halpern, 2017, p.
124), the subject becomes “afflicted with lack” (Ibid.). One particular aspect 
of  this development is characterized by Ashenden as “a move from fellowship
and civics to civility among strangers” (Ashenden, 2015, p. 44), with the 
discovery of  this issue being traced by Foucault back to, once again, the 
political economists of  the Scottish Enlightenment (Ibid.). Ashenden goes on 
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to explain that Foucault did not see this development as implying that the 
Scots were relinquishing the concept of  the acting subject but rather that they 
saw the subject of  political economy as functioning “within a totality that 
eludes him and which nevertheless founds the rationality of  his egoistic 
choices” (Ibid., p. 43), in other words they saw that the meanings and 
consequences of  the actions taken by subjects could no longer be understood,
except from within the point of  view of  “an emerging statistical account of  
population” (Ibid., p. 44). As Ferguson observed, influencing Marx on this 
matter, the development of  civil society and the accompanying division of  
labor led to the emergence of  a certain kind of  disconnectedness from any 
noneconomical form of  relationship (Hill, 2007, p. 350). 
If  commercial society is conceptualized as increasingly atomizing society into 
a web of  needs and individual interests mediated through the market then this
will inevitably lead to meaningful action becoming an impossibility in 
Ferguson’s view, since there will no longer be room for any commonly held 
political sphere (Halpern, 2017, p. 57). This is the way in which Halpern 
(Ibid.) connects Ferguson’s crisis of  tragedy and of  action to the crisis he saw 
as existing between the different spheres of  society. This reduction of  the 
extent of  what is perceived as comprehensible, rational action is central for 
the crisis of  action and ethics we are concerned with here. As Halpern notes, 
the fact that people come be seen as reducible to populations threatens “to 
make one’s actions appear entirely inconsequential” (Ibid., p. 46), needless to 
say this would make meaningful action if  not impossible then at least 
completely occluded from our view, the meanings of  actions would be 
completely ambiguous for everyone involved. While the subject would still act 
their acts can no longer carry “ethical weight” (Ibid., p. 38), as they are 
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reduced to blindly staggering around as individually replaceable cogwheels 
within an “overarching, spontaneous order” (Ibid.) that determines what 
actions are taken. For Moishe Postone something like this state of  affairs 
holds true within capitalism in general, with him stating that people “make 
history, but, as it were, behind their own back, i.e., they make history by 
creating structures that compel them to act in certain ways” (Blumberg & 
Nogales, 2008, p. 1). 
On this point and with regard to the question of  civil society as harbinger of  
change, it is however also important to note here that for Ferguson conflict 
does not only lead to change, just as much it results in brittle equilibriums 
forming between the objects of  social conflict (Hill, 2001, p. 296). As 
Foucault describes his point of  view, Ferguson argues that through these 
equilibriums people “are spontaneously brought together by bonds of  
benevolence” (Foucault, 2008, p. 305). Different factors, chiefly economical in
nature, will however inevitably disrupt these equilibriums, acting as a harbinger
of  change. As Foucault phrases it, “that which produces the unity of  the 
social fabric is at the same time that which produces the principle of  historical
transformation and the constant rending of  the social fabric” (Ibid., pp. 306). 
The bonds holding society together are at one and the same time 
spontaneously produced by commercial society and undermined by it as it 
comes to dominate social life (Ibid., p. 303). And how else could the situation 
of  the caregivers be understood, where they are on the one hand aware of  
their situation being untenable and on the other hand all in largely the same 
situation as a group by dint of  their ill family members? The existence of  
something like this uncertain equilibrium could also be used to explain how 
the caregivers are capable of  sharing such a similar understanding of  their 
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situation as a social group, how they have managed to stake out their own 
claim between the competing claims of  family, state and civil society. 
6.4.1. At the mercy of  civil society? 
With the above discussion of  the enervating yet productive function of  civil 
society qua commercial society within society in mind I think it will be 
necessary to look a bit deeper at exactly what is at play here. There are indeed 
reasons to be wary of  putting unfounded hope in the capacity of  civil society 
to solve its own crises, not to speak of  having it serve as “an unproblematic 
normative horizon” (Ashenden, 2015, p. 38) for sociologists and other social 
scientists, as Ashenden cautions. Coming to similar conclusion, Foucault 
argues that we should not take the categories of  civil society and state as once 
and for all given, as “an historical universal enabling us to examine every 
concrete system” (Foucault, 2008, p. 319) but rather as “a form of  
schematization peculiar to a particular technology of  government” (Ibid.), 
referring here of  course to the technologies of  governing that exist in 
modern, liberal, capitalist society.  Whatever the case may be it appears as if  
we have to come to terms with civil society in one way or another for the time
being, even if  we agree that it might be naive to expect civil society to itself  
contain the solution to the disruptions it engenders it might still be the case 
that we are at its mercy, so to speak, if  we are right in looking at our social-
historical situation as being one where the capacity of  action to effect 
meaningful change has become increasingly obsolete. 
It would however perhaps be too reckless to here simply portray caregivers as 
being completely and irrevocably stuck in the social-historical situation 
described above, as having to live in a society that is constantly changing for 
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reasons that can only be pinpointed retroactively, groping blindly in the 
uncertain hope that their efforts will lead to some sort of  change even as any 
resolution forever evades them, and so on. But if  the framework staked out 
here is at all worth anything and if  we place credence in the subsequent 
analysis we would have to concede that the situation described above is not 
only more or less the situation facing the caregivers studied in this thesis but 
also, crucially, that it is more or less the situation we all find ourselves in to 
some degree owing to our social-historical circumstances. 
6.5. Tragedy and ethical quandaries grounding intelligibility
Goldmann (1970, pp. 277 – 282) argues that the absence of  a historical 
perspective within the tragic worldview keeps it trapped in a position where a 
future that is fundamentally different from current conditions cannot be 
accounted for, in his words “it knows only the present and eternity” (Ibid., p. 
281), meaning that contradictions can only be conceptualized as occurring 
between these two poles, on the one hand those of  existing conditions and on
the other those of  eternity and absolute values. If  we follow Goldmann on 
this it would imply that in so far as this worldview is incapable of  
accommodating an account of  how presently existing conditions can be 
overturned, how the state of  affairs that keeps the social groups this outlook 
belongs to trapped in the predicament they find themselves in, they will as a 
consequence of  this incapacity necessarily be unable to fully transcend the 
tragic vision of  the world. 
To return to the case of  caregivers it is, I would argue, easy to see how this 
kind out outlook would result in a tragic outcome if  applied to their situation; 
as I have alluded to earlier the caregivers seemed to agree that old values and 
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ethical frameworks were no longer enough for them as they tried to navigate 
the difficulties of  the situation they found themselves in. However I would 
simultaneously argue that the tragic vision is not dispensed with so easily. 
After all, if  a historical perspective with its attendant perception that present 
conditions are not eternal is what is needed to overcome the tragic vision then
this would necessarily mean that insofar as caregivers, or any other social 
group for that matter, find themselves locked out from any prospect of  
improving their lot in any fundamental way they will be relegated to an 
outlook that is to some extent tragic. And what does this imply if  looked at 
from the point of  view of  the numerous marxisant authors cited in this thesis,
who all hold that capitalism in the guise of  civil society is the process 
currently driving history? To me it would seem as if  this part of  Goldmann’s 
argument, that of  a superseding of  tragedy, correspond more or less with 
Halpern’s conclusions about the fading away of  action, with the caveat that 
Goldmann obviously sees the post-tragic vision as an unambiguous 
improvement over the tragic one while Halpern refrains from making any 
overt value judgments on this subject. 
While it is perhaps not explicitly stated I will argue that something like a sense 
of  history exists for the caregivers, even if  often a pessimistic one. Awareness 
of  the historicity of  their situation would also seem to fit well with their non-
moralizing stance toward each other, as we will see with regard to Butler’s 
discussion of  here. Developing their argument that self-opacity can serve as 
grounds for an ethic,  Butler (2005, pp. 41 – 42) notes that accounting for the 
historical perspective requires us to acknowledge that we are at all times not 
exactly just what we present ourselves as and that no-one else can be either, 
since a completely coherent view of  ourselves is an impossibility. Seeing 
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ourselves in the other because we cannot ever fully capture and nail down 
what we ourselves are within a constantly changing society would appear to 
call for reciprocal patience with each other, an understanding that one is not 
ever self-same at any given time (Ibid.). I would argue that something like this 
patience is exactly what could be observed within the peer support group, as 
noted earlier any form of  expectation of  ethical certitude was conspicuously 
absent at these meetings. There appeared to be a shared understanding that 
the situations faced by the caregivers were constantly developing and that no 
solid frameworks could thus be nailed down once and for all, at least for the 
time being. 
Butler also seems to argue for the potential of  ethical frameworks as a mode 
of  critique, describing how the later Foucault understood that “ethics can only
be understood in terms of  a process of  critique, where critique attends, 
among other things, to the regimes of  intelligibility that order ontology” 
(Ibid., p. 109). With regard to the caregivers this would seem to make sense, 
they often framed their claims toward the institution of  psychiatry and toward
society in ethical terms, as a question of  what ought to be the case. As 
Goldmann writes on the topic of  the tragic vision “it is the sick organ which 
creates awareness”, (Goldmann, 1970, p. 48) by which he means that it is 
during times when historical certainties are upended that people are capable 
of  achieving the greatest amount of  awareness regarding their place in the 
world, clearly associating a tragic outlook with a relatively high degree of  
perceptiveness. Perhaps something like this could help explain why the 
outlook of  caregivers seem so heavily marked by the tragic vision, after all in 
having their lives upended by a family member becoming disordered they are 
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forced to become aware of  their situation in a new way in order to be able to 
deal with it. 
In a somewhat similar vein Foucault also saw tragedy as creating a space for 
collectively examining the limits of  conflicting social values, as Tirkkonen 
(2018, p. 118) has shown. Now then, if  we are to stick with the argument that 
the outlook of  caregivers can be understood as in some sense tragic and if  we 
accept the analysis above of  the relation between ethics, tragedy and critique 
then this would allow us to reconceptualize the caregivers’ acknowledgment of
the irreconcilable aspects of  their situation as not signifying a renunciation of  
any hope for the possibility of  change but rather as a formally necessary step 
in making their situation intelligible for themselves. Their tragic vision would 
be what enables them to perceive and understand the social-historical limits 
hemming them into the situation they find themselves in. As Goldmann puts 
it in the Hidden God, “the tragic mind becomes aware of  the limits prescribing 
both it and the external world … it sees everything in clear and unambiguous 
outline, even its own paradoxical character and the fundamental ambiguity of  
the world” (Goldmann, 1970, p. 58). Here it is however important to note that
Goldmann is describing this tragic vision in its highest possible form of  
expression, within tragic drama, not as an actually existing characteristic of  
historical individuals. Despite this caution I still argue that the outlook of  the 
caregivers can be seen as tragic in the sense used here, after all it is important 
to here remember that in Goldmann’s formulation tragic vision is a 
characteristic belonging to a social class or group and not some free-floating 
idealistic-formalistic abstraction (e.g., Ibid., pp. 17 – 19). 
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To elaborate further on this point, it is crucial to remember the irresoluble 
nature of  tragedy; the eventual solution to the problems posed by tragedy 
cannot ever be found within the tragic vision itself. As Vernant writes, tragedy 
was already for the Greeks “a questioning to which there can be no answers” 
(Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, p. 38), something that I would argue still holds true 
for Goldmann’s and Halpern’s conclusions about more modern forms of  
tragedy. I have after all earlier in this thesis argued that the solutions to 
quandaries seen as tragic in the present are likely to come from an outside 
place, a sphere exterior to the impossibly rigid realm of  tragedy, whether this 
outside is conceptualized as an inexorable result of  history as Goldmann 
(1970) does, as the uncertain result of  the vicissitudes of  commercial society 
as Halpern (2017) seems to argue or as civil society acting in the guise of  a 
motor of  history, as in Foucault’s (Foucault, et al., 2008) interpretation of  
Ferguson’s view. While there are clear differences between the interpretations 
of  these three writers I would still claim that there is an even clearer 
underlying affinity at play here, as I hope that I have shown in the preceding 
discussion as well as in the chapter on the theoretical framework of  the thesis.
6.6. Taking action when there is nothing one can do
Above we have discussed how the category of  the tragic is necessary to 
account for if  we want to understand how caregivers come to understand 
their own situation, how they make it meaningful for themselves. But if  we are
discussing meaning-making and intelligibility then what about action, Halpern 
(2017) has after all shown that meaningfulness necessarily has to imply 
meaningful action. His stance echoes an observation made by Goldmann 
(1970, p. 52), that a tragic outlook can never be characterized by a complete 
break with the world, as an absolute assertion of  the meaninglessness of  the 
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world would necessarily imply that any act taken within this world would also 
lack meaning. In a somewhat paradoxical fashion any meaningful rejection of  
the world must be performed by actors placing themselves at the center of  the
very world they are trying to reject (Ibid.). 
In an earlier work Halpern (1991) puts forward an argument that is relevant 
for this matter, namely that tragedy involves a kind of  attempt to “manifest 
value through its destruction” (Ibid., p. 268), with the desire of  the Earl of  
Gloucester to throw himself  off  of  the cliffs of  Dover in King Lear serving as 
a sort of  metacommentary on how this matter is enacted within the play 
according to Halpern. Here the tragic vision does not emerge from the 
saddened realization that the values underlying tragedy cannot be realized but 
from the very act of  relinquishing what is still to some extent a righteous, if  
incomplete, value system (Ibid., 298 – 269). And what exactly does this imply 
if  applied to the case of  the caregivers? Perhaps that the act of  throwing out 
ethical frameworks that have ended up being seen as inadequate does not 
automatically imply that one has to judge them as ethical failures or as 
ridiculous follies. Rather, they could be acknowledged to have possessed a 
certain grandeur that becomes apparent in the very act of  getting rid of  them.
If  it is after all as I have implied, that the total dedication to a value system 
required by classical conceptions of  tragedy will, for those attempting to hold 
true to the values in question, inevitably have to end in death, madness or a 
similar rejection of  the world of  the living; if  we are to be able to say that 
proper resolve has been demonstrated then these are the only acceptable 
options. 
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If  there is nothing that is unambiguous then nothing can be made 
fundamentally meaningful, yet nothing is unambiguous until it is over. The 
way the author Yukio Mishima (1991), writing explicitly on the subject of  
tragedy, writes about how the only way to tell if  an apple is healthy all the way 
through to its core is to cut it in half. Applied to people this approach is of  
course distressing, one cannot be certain of  measuring up to the impossibly 
high standards of  tragedy before one is dead. The dead for their part cannot 
be certain of  anything, they are forever removed from the world of  the living 
and from intelligibility. In a purely formal way it is thus impossible to live fully 
in accordance with the demands of  action and tragedy, it is at most possible to
die in accordance with them. Either one renounces the world or one 
renounces tragedy and the values it entails. From the point of  view of  tragedy,
accommodating oneself  to the world by even the smallest degree is enough to
irrevocably close oneself  off  from the pure, unconditional realm of  the tragic 
for all time (e.g., Goldmann, 1970, p. 323). Indeed, as Goldmann (Ibid., pp. 
388 – 389) shows, acts that may strike contemporary readers as intuitively 
sensible, such as valuing life over death or even basic common sense are 
anathema for tragedy. This being the case, how could caregivers ever hope to 
opt for a choice other than throwing the whole ethical edifice over the 
figurative edge of  the cliff, seeing as the only formally coherent alternative 
would be death, e.g. throwing oneself  off  of  a cliff. This is after all the 
completely unreasonable, yet simultaneously indispensable, demand of  
tragedy. The only way to recuperate anything at all from the values espoused 
in and through tragedy would thus have to involve something like the kind of  
letting go or “act of  dépense”  (Halpern, 1991, p. 269) that Halpern describes 
above, using Bataillean terminology. 
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I would argue that this irresolubility is also reflected in the realm of  the 
ethical, when the caregivers discuss their situation from a normative point of  
view, more specifically in the fact that while discussing ethics the caregivers 
often seemed to take for granted, in an implicit sense, that any ethical 
framework that one could apply to the situation of  caregivers was provisional. 
As mentioned earlier, it was in fact a common occurrence that participants 
would preface their accounts by stating, as a kind of  disclaimer, that while a 
particular mode of  conduct or a given disposition had worked out well in their
case it was uncertain that the same course of  action would work out favorably 
for another family. On the same note, while I do not believe that I once heard 
the caregivers moralize about each others’ behavior, the moralizing posture of
non-caregivers on the other hand was often decried. Ethical action was only 
ever discussed in how it occurred as a response to concrete situations. As one 
of  the caregivers I interviewed put it, the actions that a caregiver may have to 
take at a given time might be justified right then and there but might prove to 
be completely unjustified when applied at a later point in time. What was 
crucial according to the interviewee in question was rather that one makes a 
decision and acts when circumstances calls one to do so.
But this kind of  action offered little sense of  closure for the caregivers, with 
one of  the interviewees describing her situation as still being unresolved and 
up in the air even after years of  participation in the group meetings, this being
preceded by years during which she struggled with her situation alone. This 
same caregiver also made clear that she did not expect her situation to ever 
change. All the same she also told me that she took an active part in the work 
done by the association organizing the meetings, to the point that she 
described it as forming a significant part of  her life. She also persisted in 
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caring for her ill adult son, taking care of  numerous domestic chores he was 
unable to handle on his own, all the while also being forced to live in a state of
constant vigilance on account of  the son’s self-destructive tendencies. In other
words she very much did take action in dealing with the situation she found 
herself  in, both in her everyday life as a family member and as a member of  
wider society in working within the association. 
At first look the situation this caregiver found herself  in, which was not 
fundamentally unlike that of  several other support group participants as far as
I could tell, would appear to be somewhat to contain a contradiction in regard
to how the situation is perceived as opposed to how it is lived. I would 
however argue that it is perhaps not so contradictory as it would appear at first
look that caregivers seem to be able to simultaneously hold on to a tragic 
vision and to still persevere in some form of  hope against all hope with regard
to their situation, as Vernant notes that even among the Greeks the tragic 
vision was accompanied by a concomitant viewpoint that “is optimistic, for 
man has his own tasks that he can accomplish” (Vernant, 1988, p. 119), with 
him positing that the reason that the tragedy of  the Geeks still is meaningful 
for us is that a similar kind of  ambiguity that characterized their society also 
characterizes ours. With the conclusions drawn by Halpern (2017) in regard to
the waning of  a sense of  the tragic and its connection to the matching waning
of  the possibility of  action in mind the coexistence of  tragic vision and belief  
in the need for action posited by Vernant here would seem to fit well with the 
overall view argued for in this thesis, and with the situation of  the caregiver 
described above; being forced to take action even as no triumph within the 
world seems to be possible is after all central to situation of  the tragic 
character in her struggles.
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6.7. Alternative future approaches
If  the conclusions drawn in this thesis prove to hold any worth they might 
also point us toward other worthwhile ways of  studying these matters in the 
future. To take one example, it occurred to me some time after I had gathered 
all my research material and settled on my theoretical approach that studying 
the literary output of  caregivers could have been a good supplement for the 
inquiry of  this thesis, not least because of  how heavily the argument relies on 
theory relating to literature and drama. In other words, doing what Goldmann
(1970) was doing in The Hidden God, a sociology of  literature focusing 
specifically on works written by caregivers about their situation. In addition to 
this another approach might be to study material published by caregiver’s 
organizations, such as monthly membership magazines or texts they publish 
online. While conducting my participatory observation I did in fact have the 
chance to familiarize myself  with just this kind of  material,  encountering a 
certain kind of  genre of  text, sometimes structured as an interview, where 
caregivers are allowed to “tell their story” so to speak. It seems like an obvious
point of  inquiry if  one wanted to conduct an examination of  the worldview 
of  caregivers in the style of  Goldmann’s the Hidden God. 
7. Conclusions
The subject matter of  this thesis might at first look appear to be a quite 
simple exercise for a sociologist; looking at our subject of  study from an 
abstracted perspective, we have a group of  people who exist at the nexus of  
certain conflicts. Within the family, a conflict arising out of  unreason or 
madness, then as the family situation becomes unbearable a crisis within the 
family. Then as the family struggles to reorient itself  to this new situation we 
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next have a conflict between family and the surrounding society, which can be 
split up into civil society and state. Then we have a concept that describes the 
outlook created by this overall process, namely tragedy. But having stated this 
we have not said anything about what is actually going on, we have merely 
posited a number of  relations between abstractions. 
Therefore it was necessary to, firstly, attempt to draw the connections between
all of  these concepts and, secondly, to explain the development of  these 
conceptions as their material basis has shifted throughout time. Now, this 
could of  course only be done in broad strokes within the purview of  this 
thesis and I have therefore relied on the work of  earlier writers to sketch what
might be called an outline of  the subject. It is surely no coincidence that 
Goldmann has come to the conclusion that a sociologist engaging in this kind 
of  analysis cannot ever hope to “end up with an exhaustive meaning and 
explanation” (Goldmann, 1980, p. 70), since what I have termed concepts in 
this thesis and what Goldmann for his part calls “processes of  structuration” 
(Ibid.) are always mediated through other concepts or processes from the get-
go. If  we accept that concepts are historically contingent we have to give up 
hope of  ever finding a truly definite, primordial or stable basis for them.
With this in mind it would be massively arrogant to think that by isolating and
describing some of  the ways in which the situation of  the caregivers can be 
understood we have somehow figured out or even solved the situation the 
caregivers face, this is of  course absolutely not the case. In fact, if  anything 
definite can be said about the conclusions drawn in this thesis it is that no easy
solutions seem to be imminent, as I have mentioned earlier the caregivers were
well aware that there were still a great deal of  work to do if  families were to 
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be able to care for their kin in the way they clearly wanted to. While the most 
immediate issues to be solved might very well be located within the institution
of  psychiatry I hope that this thesis can give an intimation as to how even 
some of  the most fundamental ways in which contemporary society is 
constituted affect the situation the caregivers find themselves in. The 
caregivers cannot simply sit down and wait for the great tides of  history to 
sweep away all the troubles they face. As the previously mentioned 
interviewee put it circumstances do in fact make their own demands in the 
moment. Even conceding that it looks likely that their situation will have to 
remain in some way unsolved until the relationships between family, state and 
civil society shift radically this does not mean that their situation will remain 
static. Remaining static is not possible for them. Even irresolvable situations 
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